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Abstract

The sign-and-then-encrypt approaches have been widely adopted in secure applications.
The computational cost of these approaches is the sum of the corresponding signing cost
and encryption cost. Signcryption achieves the same effect as sign-and-then-encrypt,
but is more efficient, since the computational cost is less than sign-and-then-encrypt.
In this thesis, we present further studies on signcryption to explore some nice properties
for better applicability.
We notice that the features of identity-based cryptography have not been well investigated in signcryption. We also observe that there is a potential to further improve
computational efficiency of signcryption by pre-computation. We therefore propose
identity-based online/offline signcryption to capture those features. We provide the notion of identity-based online/offline signcryption and the corresponding security model.
We then present two efficient constructions of identity-based online/offline signcryption. Besides the computational efficiency due to signcryption, pre-computation in the
online/offline approach further reduces the computational overhead. We show that
our schemes are secure against chosen ciphertext attacks and existential unforgeable
against chosen message attacks respectively in the random oracle model.
As an extension to our study, a generic construction of identity-based online/offline
signcryption and a generic online/offline broadcast signcryption scheme will be also
presented. In our construction, any identity-based signature and encryption schemes
can be applied to our online/offline signcryption in identity-based settings. A security
proof is presented to show the invulnerability of our generic schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Background

Cryptography plays a crucial role in the constructions of secure systems. Many cryptographic schemes have been proposed to solve security problems. Some of them have
become industry standards and have been wildly used in the real world applications.
As a security measure, authentication and confidentiality are always required simultaneously in real world applications. However, the computational costs to achieving
authentication and confidentiality are not always satisfactory. There has been an urgent demand for further improving computational efficiency.

1.2

The Challenge

Authentication and confidentiality are often required at the same time in security applications. In cryptography, authentication is achieved with signature schemes and
confidentiality is achieved with encryption schemes. The usual way to achieve both is
to sequentially sign a message and then encrypt it, i.e., the so-called sign-and-thenencrypt approach. The total computational cost is the sum of the costs for signing and
encryption. Signcryption, as proposed by Zheng [74], is a good solution to authentication and confidentiality, since it is more efficient than sign-and-then-encrypt. However,
we still face some challenges when signcryption is implemented in resource-constraint
or time-constraint systems. We view the challenge as follows:
Although there exist a number of efficient signcryption schemes, they are still too
heavy to be implemented in resource-constraint systems, in particular, when signcryption is implemented in an identity-based scenario. Most of identity-based protocols are
implemented with pairing-based cryptography which requires costly computations.
We propose a solution to respond to the challenge by introducing pre-computation,
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i.e., the so-called online/offline approach, where some computational tasks are conducted in an offline phase which can be done without the knowledge of the target
message. The online computations can be carried out very efficiently after the message
has arrived. To our knowledge, neither a construction of identity-based online/offline
signcryption nor any security model exists in the literature. Our solution accommodates a novel identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme and its security model.
We further extend our answer to the challenge by proposing a generic identitybased online/offline signcryption, i.e., the construction is independent of the selection
of signature and encryption. According to [1], not all the compositions of signature and
encryption yield a secure signcryption. Therefore, it is a new challenge to us. We notice
that there exists no generic construction of identity-based online/offline signcryption
which is provable secure in the literature.

1.3

Existing Solutions

Since Zheng’s [74] seminal work, signcryption primitives have been extensively investigated. Malone-Lee [45] proposed the first identity-based signcryption. Unfortunately,
the scheme is not semantically secure. Libert and Quisquater [42] proposed a solution to fix the problem, but the properties of public verifiability and forward security
are mutually exclusive. McCullagh and Barreto [46] proposed an efficient, semantically and forward secure signcryption scheme, in a transferable and non-transferable
form. The transferable scheme directly addresses the problem in [42]. Nalla and Reddy
proposed another solution [49] which is inherently non-transferable. In [13], Boyen proposed a Multipurpose Identity-Based Signcryption and gave the security notions for
signcryption, including message confidentiality, signature non-repudiation, ciphertext
unlinkability, ciphertext authentication, and ciphertext anonymity. Afterwards, Chen
and Malone-Lee proposed a more efficient scheme [16] which was analyzed in the model
of [13]. Recently, Barreto et al [3] proposed a much more efficient signcryption than
previous counterparts.
To extend the applicability of public key cryptography in resource-constraint devices, Even, Goldreich, and Micali [24] proposed the online/offline notion. In their
work, a generic scheme was constructed. It can be used to convert any signature
scheme into an online/offline signature. Their scheme increases the size of each signature by a quadratic factor, hence, it has little practical interest. A much more
efficient generic online/offline signature was proposed by Shamir and Tauman [64] in
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2001. A chameleon hash function was utilized to implement a paradigm called “hashsign-switch” in their work. We can convert any signature scheme to a more efficient
online/offline signature scheme. The efficiency of the online signing phase is comparable to that of Even, Goldreich and Micali’s work which does not require any heavy
computations. The length of the key and signature are much shorter than the former. Afterwards, a much more efficient generic online/offline signature was proposed
by Chen et al. [17]. They provided a novel solution to combine a double-trapdoor hash
family and a hash-sign-switch paradigm. Their scheme is more efficient than previous
schemes, because it achieves the lower computation and storage cost for the offline
phase, and the lower communication cost for the online phase.
Online/offline signcryption was introduced by An, Dodis, and Rabin [1]. The work
mainly concentrated on the security analysis of general composition of signature and
encryption schemes in asymmetric settings. They analyzed security of “encrypt-thensign”, “sign-then-encrypt” and “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” paradigms in both insider and outsider attack conditions. The proposed solution is a generic scheme which
can apply any asymmetric signature and encryption scheme in public key settings.
There is no concrete scheme provided in that work. A first concrete online/offline
signcryptionin scheme was proposed by Zhang, Mu, and Susilo [72] in 2005. In their
scheme, the online part does not require heavy computations, hence, it is very efficient.
Moreover, the size of a signature is short since they use the notion of short signature.
Recently, Xu et al. [71] also proposed an online/offline signcryption protocol with the
properties of confidentiality, authentication, integrity, forward secrecy and resistance
to man-in-the-middle attacks. In this scheme, each user has to interact with other
users to exchange the key, which may reduce the efficiency of the system.

1.4

Contributions

The goal of this thesis is twofold: (1) constructing new efficient cryptographic schemes
which achieve both authentication and confidentiality, and (2) constructing security
models and analyzing the security of our schemes.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. Novel identity-based online/offline signcryptions.
2. A generic scheme of identity-based online/offline signcryption.
3. Definitions of security model for identity-based online/offline signcryption.
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4. Proofs of our schemes in the random oracle model.

1.5

Overview of Chapters

The thesis is organised in the following way:
In Chapter 2, we review the cryptographic preliminaries on which the rest of the
thesis is based. Firstly, we introduce some preliminaries, including primitives in number theory, hash functions, bilinear maps, computational assumptions and random
oracle model. We also review public-key cryptography and identity-based cryptography. We then study the security notions of digital signatures, encryption schemes and
signcryption schemes.
In Chapter 3, we provide a literature review of existing online/offline signature
schemes which are related to our results. We review some constructions based on
public-key cryptography and identity-based signcryption protocols.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the study of our identity-based online/offline signcryption.
We give the definition of identity-based online/offline signcryption and its security
notions in outsider and insider attack models. We present two efficient constructions
of our identity-based online/offline signcryptions. Both of these schemes can achieve
authenticity and confidentiality simultaneously and allow offline pre-computation. We
show that our schemes are secure in random oracle model.
In Chapter 5, a generic construction of ID-based online/offline signcryption is presented. The scheme is independent of the selection of signature and encryption protocols. We also prove that our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
(IND-gCCA2) and is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks
(UF-CMA). We also construct a generic online/offline broadcast signcryption scheme.
In Chapter 6, we provide a summary of this research.

Chapter 2
Cryptographic Background
In this chapter, we will provide a brief review of cryptographic background, which is
necessary for understanding the rest of the thesis. We first introduce some preliminaries, including number theory, hash functions, bilinear maps, computational assumptions
and random oracle model. Then PKI-based and ID-based cryptography will be visited.
Security notions for digital signatures, encryption schemes and signcryption schemes
will be discussed. Finally, we give a concept of Provable Security. We are aiming
to provide a self-contained cryptography background in this chapter so that readers
with little knowledge in this field will be able to understand the ideas and arguments
presented in the thesis.

5
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Cryptographic Preliminaries
Number Theory

First of all, we will review some basic definitions [47] from number theory which forms
the foundation of modern cryptography.
Definition 1 A non-negative integer d is the greatest common divisor of integers a
and b, denoted d = gcd(a, b), if
(1) d is a common divisor of a and b; and
(2) whenever c|a and c|b, then c|d.
Definition 2 Two integers a and b are said to be relatively prime or coprime if
gcd(a, b) = 1.
Definition 3 For n ≥ 1, let φ(n) denote the number of integers in the interval [1, n]
which are relatively prime to n. The function is called the Euler phi function (or the
Euler totient function).
Definition 4 If a and b are integers, then a is said to be congruent to b modulo n,
written a ≡ b mod n, if n divides (a − b). The integer n is called the modulus of the
congruence.
Definition 5 The integers modulo n, denoted Zn , is the set of (equivalence classes
of ) integers {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Addition, subtraction, and multiplication in Zn are
performed modulo n.
Definition 6 Let a ∈ Zn . The multiplicative inverse of a modulo n is an integer
x ∈ Zn such that ax ≡ 1 mod n. If such an x exists, then it is unique, and a is said
to be invertible, or a unit; the inverse of a is denoted by a−1 .
Definition 7 Let a, b ∈ Zn . Division of a by b modulo n is the product of a and b−1
modulo n, and is only defined if b is invertible modulo n.
Definition 8 The multiplicative group of Zn is Z∗n = {a ∈ Zn |gcd(a, n) = 1}. In
particular, if n is a prime, then Zn∗ = {a|1 ≤ a ≤ n − 1}.
Definition 9 The order of Zn∗ is defined to be the number of elements in Zn∗ , namely
|Zn∗ |.
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Definition 10 Let a ∈ Z∗n . The order of a, denoted ord(a), is the least positive integer
t such that at ≡ 1 mod n.
Definition 11 Let α ∈ Z∗n . If the order of α is φ(n), then α is said to be a generator
or a primitive element of Zn∗ . If Zn∗ has a generator, then Zn∗ is said to be cyclic.
More inquisitive audience can refer to [47] for further details.

2.1.2

Cryptographic Hash Functions

Cryptographic hash functions are one of the most important primitives in cryptography. The hash functions take a string of arbitrary length and output a string of fixed
length, called “hash value”. Because of their significance, they are widely used in cryptography [8, 26, 69]. We can see that the range of hash functions are usually smaller
than their domain, so they are not injective. We have to devise the functions so that
they are computationally infeasible to find collisions. We denote a hash function as
follows:
h = H(M ),
where h is the fixed-length hash value and M is a variable-length message. The existence of collision requires cryptographic hash functions to meet the following properties:
(1) Computability: Given an input M , it is computationally feasible to find H(M )
in polynomial time.
(2) Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value h, it should be hard to find M such
that H(M ) = h.
(3) Second pre-image resistance: Given message M , it should be hard to find
M 0 6= M such that H(M 0 ) = H(M ).
(4) Collision resistance: It is hard to find a pair of messages (M, M 0 ), where
M 6= M 0 , such that H(M ) = H(M 0 ).
To date, a variety of cryptographic hash functions, which include popular MD-5 [57]
and SHA-1 [51], have been proposed. Unfortunately they were proven not to be collision
resistant recently [67, 68], because the designing of those primitives is non-trivial.
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Chameleon Hash Family

Chameleon hash function (or, the so-called trapdoor hash function) is a cryptographic
tool introduced by Krawczyk et al [40]. Each chameleon hash function has a private/public key pair. It is hard to find collisions without the private key. We will
review some properties of chameleon hash function as follows:
Definition 12 [64] (chameleon hash family) A chameleon hash family consists of a
pair (L, H):
• Assume L is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) key generation algorithm that
on input 1k , outputs a pair (HK, T K) such that the sizes of HK, T K are polynomially related to k.
• Assume H is a family of randomized hash functions. Every hash function in H
is associated with a hash key HK, and is applied to a message from a space M
and a random element from a finite space R. The output of hash function HHK
does not depend on T K.
A chameleon hash family (L, H) has the following properties:
1. Efficiency: Given a hash key HK and a pair (m, r) ∈ M × R, HHK (m, r) can
be computed in polynomial time.
2. Collision resistance: There is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A
that on input HK outputs, with a non-negligible probability, two pairs (m1 , r1 ),
(m2 , r2 ) ∈ M × R that satisfy HHK (m1 , r1 ) = HHK (m2 , r2 ) and m1 6= m2 .
3. Trapdoor collisions: There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that
given a pair (HK, T K) ← L(1k ), a pair (m1 , r1 ) ∈ M × R, and an additional
message m2 ∈ M, outputs a value r2 ∈ R such that:
• HHK (m1 , r1 ) = HHK (m2 , r2 ).
• If r1 is uniformly distributed in R then the distribution of r2 is computationally indistinguishable from uniform in R.
There are a variety of constructions based on different assumptions (e.g., factoring
assumption and discrete log assumption) [40]. The most efficient construction appeared
in [64].

2.1. Cryptographic Preliminaries

2.1.4

9

Bilinear Map

Bilinear map (or, the so-called pairing) is a cryptographic tool which has been extensively investigated in many applications [11, 12, 39, 73] recently. In 2000, Sakai et
al [60] proposed the seminal work based on the bilinear map. Their scheme solved the
open problem proposed by [63]. Boneh and Franklin [10] later proposed an ID-based
encryption with security proof.
We formally define the concept and properties of bilinear pairing as follows:
Definition 13 Let k be a security parameter and q be a k-bit prime number. Let G1
and G2 be groups of the same prime order q. There is a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2
with the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: for all P, Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq∗ , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab .
(2) Non-degeneracy: for any generator P ∈ G1 , e(P, P ) 6= 1.
(3) Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q), for P, Q ∈
G1 .
The bilinear maps also possess additional properties as follows:
(1) for all P1 , P2 , Q ∈ G1 , e(P1 + P2 , Q) = e(P1 , Q) · e(P2 , Q).
(2) for all P, Q ∈ G1 , e(P, Q) = e(Q, P ).
(3) if for P ∈ G1 we have e(P, Q) = 1 for all Q ∈ G1 , then Q = O.
The group G1 is written additively in here. Typically G1 is a subgroup of elements
on an elliptic curve. The Non-degeneracy implies that if P generates G1 , e(P, P )
generates G2 . The map e is called an admissible bilinear map. We can obtain such
non-degenerate admissible maps over cyclic groups from the Weil or the Tate pairing
over supersingular elliptic curves [10] or abelian varieties [59]. For the reasons of
simplicity, we will use the term bilinear map to refer to the admissible bilinear map
denoted above in the rest of this paper.

2.1.5

Computational Assumptions

In this section, we will present some computational assumptions. The security of our
schemes rely on the difficulty of the following problems.
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Definition 14 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH)) Given (P, aP,
bP ) ∈ G3 as the input, output abP .
An algorithm A has advantage ² in solving CDH in group G if Pr[A(P, aP, bP ) =
abP ] ≥ ², where the probability is over the random choices of (a, b), and the coin tosses
of A. We say an algorithm A (t, ²)-breaks CDH in G if in time t, A has advantage ²
in solving CDH.
Definition 15 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH)) Given
two groups G1 and G2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 ,
a generator P of G1 , (aP, bP, cP ) ∈ G31 and an element h ∈ G2 , decide whether h =
e(P, P )abc or not.
An algorithm D has advantage ² in solving DBDH in (G1 , G2 ) if | Pra,b,c∈R Zq∗ ,h∈R G2 [1 ←
D(P, aP, bP, cP, h)] − Pra,b,c∈R Zq∗ [1 ← D(P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc )]| ≥ ². We say an
algorithm D (t, ²)-breaks DBDH in (G1 , G2 ) if in time t, D has advantage ² in solving
DBDH.
Definition 16 (Gap-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDH)) Let G1 and G2
be two groups of the same order q. Let P be a generator of G1 . Assume that there is a
bilinear mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2 . Let an attacker B to solve the following problem:
Given (P, aP, bP, cP ), compute a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman key e(P, P )abc with the help of
the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) oracle, which given (P, aP, bP, cP, d),
outputs true if d = e(P, P )abc and f alse otherwise.
An algorithm B has advantage ² in solving GBDH in (G1 , G2 ) if AdvGGBDH
B = Pr[B(P,
1
aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P )abc ] ≥ ². We say an algorithm B (t, ²) breaks GBDH in (G1 , G2 )
if in time t, B has advantage ² in solving GBDH.

2.1.6

Random Oracle Model

Random oracle model is a very popular mathematical model in the security proof for a
cryptographic scheme. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway [7] introduced the idea of random
oracle model which was based on the work of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [28,29]
and Fiat-Shamir [25]. Since then, the random oracle model has been widely applied in
the security proof, as opposed to the standard model. First of all, we recall a definition
taken from [7].
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Definition 17 Formally speaking, a random oracle R is a map from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}∞
chosen by selecting each bit of R(x) uniformly and independently, for every x. Of course
no actual protocol uses infinitely long outputs, this just saves us from having to say how
long “sufficiently long” is.
We use the functions of fixed-length domain in here. A random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}k is a random hash function. The domain of the function is in the range of {0, 1}k
and the domain of the input is in the range of {0, 1}∗ , which is a variable length. In the
random oracle model, all the parties involved in the scheme including adversaries have
access to one or more random oracles simulated by oracle simulators and the scheme
is proved to be secure in this model. Finally we replace the random oracle with the
a cryptographic hash function. The oracle simulator behaves like a black box and it
maintains a table which stores all the previous queries. It responds to the queries as
follows:
• If the query is in the table, the simulator returns the value corresponding to the
query.
• If the query is not in the table, the simulator returns a random value which has
uniform distribution in the output domain.
Random oracle also possesses the following properties:
• Random oracle is a one-way function (i.e., given a value as an output, it’s hard
to determine the input).
• Random oracle is collision resistant (i.e., given two different inputs, it’s hard to
get the same output with non-negligible probability).
However, some cryptographers express doubts about ROM in security proofs. The
reasons are twofold: (1) No real hash functions behave completely random and some
weakness was found in the existing cryptography hash functions, and (2) There exist
some cryptography schemes that are provably secure in the random oracle model, but
provably insecure when the random oracles are replaced by real-world hash functions [6,
14]. Despite this, most of existing cryptography schemes are provably secure under
ROM. ROM is still regarded as an important tool in security proofs. At least, it can
provide some certain level of security guarantees.

2.2. PKI-Based Cryptography vs ID-Based Cryptography

2.2
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PKI-Based Cryptography vs ID-Based Cryptography

The notion of public key cryptography was first given by Diffie and Hellman in their
seminal work [19]. In the public key cryptography, each user has a public key e and
a corresponding private key d, where d is computationally infeasible to find with a
given e. This cryptosystem is realized by public key infrastructure(PKI) [37], where
there is a certificate authority (CA) which generates a digital certificate to bind an
entity with its public key. When an entity A wants to send encrypted message to
another entity B, A should first obtain the certificate of B, which contains the public
key of B. A then encrypts the message and sends it to B. Despite PKI’s merits, the
system has not been used as quickly as desired. The major reason is that PKI contains
complex certificate construction, which involves heavy computation and management
costs. Further details can be found in [32].
To cope with the above mentioned situation, Shamir [63] introduced the notion
of identity-based cryptography. In identity-based cryptography, a public key can be
derived from a widely known identity, such as an email address, phone number, etc.
User’s private key can be generated by a trusted authority called private key generator
(PKG) with the help of the master secret key. There is no need to bind a digital
certificate and a user’s public key, since the public key is widely known. This mechanism
reduces the costs of key management and certificate verification as much as possible.
When an entity A wants to send encrypted message to another entity B, A should
first select an identity information related to B such as email address and encrypt
the message with that identity. On receiving the encrypted message, B authenticates
himself to a PKG and obtains the private key corresponding to his identity to decrypt
the message. Shamir constructed the first identity-based signature scheme in [63],
However, the construction of identity-based encryption (IBE) remained as an open
problem until the seminal work proposed by Sakai et al [60]. Thereafter, many efficient
ID-based schemes have been proposed [15, 27, 34, 41, 53]. Because of the efficiency of
the system, ID-based cryptography is now flourishing in the cryptographic community.

2.3

Digital Signature Schemes

Digital signatures are the digitalized counterpart of handwritten signatures. Any
changes on message m or s in a message-signature pair (m, s) will be detected in the
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signature verification process. There are three basic services that digital signatures can
provide. (1). Authentication: ensure the message is signed by the authorized person.
(2). Data Integrity: ensure the message is not modified by unauthorized person. (3).
Non-repudiation: the authorized person cannot deny he signed the message once he
produces a digital signature on the message, because he is the only person who can
produce the valid signature on the message. There exists many remarkable signature
schemes [23, 52, 58, 62] in the literature. In this section, we will review the syntax and
the security notion related to digital signatures.

2.3.1

Syntax

A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms: Key Generation, Sign and
Verfy.
1. Key Generation(k) → (P K, SK). Given a security parameter k as input, this
algorithm outputs public and private key pair (P K, SK).
2. Sign(m, SK) → σ. Given a message m and a private key SK as input, this
algorithm outputs a signature σ.
3. Verify(m, σ, P K) → {Accept, Reject}. Given a message m, a signature σ and a
public key P K as input, this algorithm outputs Accept if the signature is valid,
and Reject otherwise.

Figure 2.1: Digital Signature
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Correctness. The algorithm Verify will output Accept if the signature is generated as
defined above.
Accept ← Verify(m, Sign(m, SK), P K).
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [58] proposed a first practical digital signature scheme
which is called RSA signature. We present the scheme as follows:
Key Generation: Choose at random two large primes p and q; compute N = pq;
compute φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1); choose at random a number e, where 1 ≤ e ≤
φ(N ) − 1 and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1; find d such that ed = 1 (mod φ(N )); the public
key is (e, N ), and the private key is (d, p, q).
Sign: Given a message m < N and a private key (d, p, q) as input, this algorithm
outputs a signature σ as follows:
σ = md

(mod N ).

Verify: Given a message m, a signature σ and a public key (e, N ) as input, this
algorithm outputs Accept if the following equation holds, and Reject otherwise.
?

m = σe

2.3.2

(mod N ).

Security Notion

The standard security notion for a digital signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA). We describe the notion
as follows:
Definition 18 A signature scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game [31].
1. The challenger C generates all the necessary system parameters and private/public
key pair. The challenger then sends the system parameters and the public key
to the adversary A. The private key is kept secret.
2. The adversary A performs a number of signing requests on his chosen messages
to the challenger. The challenger signs the message with his private key and
returns the result to A. A can present its requests adaptively (i.e., every request
may depend on the answers to the previous ones).
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3. Finally, A outputs a signature on a message m. m has not been asked to the
challenger in step 2.
The adversary’s advantage is simply its success probability Adv(A) = P [A wins].

2.4

Encryption Schemes

An encryption scheme is a fundamental cryptographic tool which can be used to transfer
information in a secret way. There are two kinds of encryption schemes: symmetric-key
encryption and public key encryption. Those two schemes are often combined together
to achieve a variety of security goals.
In a symmetric-key encryption scheme, encryption and decryption are carried out
with the same symmetric key (or, the so-called secret key). The secret key is often
shared between the sender and the recipient. No third party can access this secret
key. Otherwise, the third party with the key can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain
the original information. The best advantage of symmetric-key encryption is the fast
speed. The encryption is often faster than its counterpart in public-key settings by
100 to 1,000 times. The problem in this scheme is the key administration. Since the
secret key is only accessible by the sender and the recipient, we must find some ways
to securely deliver the key to both parties. Many symmetric-key encryption schemes
exist in the literature (e.g., DES [50], AES [18], Twofish [61], Serpent [36]).
In a public-key encryption scheme, encryption and decryption are carried out with
different asymmetric keys (or, the so-called public key and private key). The private
key is kept secret by the owner and the public key is available to other users in the
system. When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she obtains Bob’s public key
first; encrypts the message with Bob’s public key; sends the resulting ciphertext to Bob.
When Bob receives the ciphertext, he recovers the message with his private key. Since
the private key is only available to Bob, no third party can decrypt the ciphertext. The
public-key encryption is much slower than symmetric-key encryption and it’s costly to
use, the algorithm is not suitable in the resource constraint systems.
We will review the syntax and the security notion of public key encryption in the
following sections.

2.4.1

Syntax

A public key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: Key Generation, Encrypt and Decrypt.
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1. Key Generation(k) → (P K, SK). Given a security parameter k as input, this
algorithm outputs public and private key pair (P K, SK).
2. Encrypt(m, P K) → C. Given a message m and a public key P K as input, this
algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
3. Decrypt(C, SK) → m. Given a ciphertext C and a private key SK as input,
this algorithm outputs a message m.

Figure 2.2: Public Key Encryption
Correctness. The algorithm Decrypt will output the original message m if the ciphertext is generated as defined above.
m ← Decrypt(Encrypt(m, P K), SK).
We present the RSA encryption scheme as follows:
Key Generation: Choose at random two large primes p and q; compute N = pq;
compute φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Choose at random a number e, where 1 ≤ e ≤
φ(N ) − 1 and gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1; find d such that ed = 1 (mod φ(N )). The public
key is (e, N ) and the private key is (d, p, q).
Encrypt: Given a message m < N and a public key (e, N ) as input, this algorithm
outputs a ciphertext C as follows:
C = me

(mod N ).
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Decrypt: Given a ciphertext and a private key (d, p, q) as input, this algorithm
outputs a message m as follows.
m = Cd

(mod N ).

We remark that the security of RSA algorithm is based on the hardness of factoring
N . Readers can refer to [58] for more details.

2.4.2

Security Notion

The standard security notion for an encryption scheme is ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). We describe the
notion as follows:
Definition 19 We say that an encryption scheme has the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks property (IND-CCA2) if no polynomially
bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game [56].
1. The challenger C generates all the necessary system parameters and private/public
key pair. The challenger then sends the system parameters and the public key
to the adversary A. The private key is kept secret.
2. The adversary A performs a number of decryption requests on his chosen ciphertexts to the challenger. The challenger decrypts the ciphertext with his private
key and return the result to A. A can present its requests adaptively (i.e., every
request may depend on the answers to the previous ones).
3. A chooses two equal-length plaintexts (m0 , m1 ) and sends them to C. C tosses
a fair coin b ∈R {0, 1} and encrypts mb to obtain a ciphertext. The Challenger
returns the ciphertext (i.e., challenge ciphertext) to A.
4. A asks again a number of requests just like in step 2. This time, he can not make
an decryption request of the challenge ciphertext.
5. Finally, A produces a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
The adversary’s advantage is defined to be Adv(A) = |2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1|.
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Signcryption Schemes

Encryption and digital signature are two important primitives, which have been widely
used in public-key cryptography. In many applications, it is desirable to combine both
functionalities to achieve authentication and confidentiality at the same time (e.g., secure shell (SSH) [35] and secure email (S/MIME) [38]). A common approach to achieve
this goal is to sign-then-encrypt the message sequentially. The major disadvantage of
this solution is that it expands the size of resulting ciphertext and increases the computing time for the sender and the recipient, as signing and encryption are carried out
separately. Furthermore, such simple composition of encryption and signature can’t
guarantee the security of the final scheme, even if the basic encryption and signature
are secure, because there are a number of subtle points to be considered to obtain a
secure protocol. Motivated by those issues, Zheng [74, 75] proposed a novel primitive
called signcryption, in which encryption and signature are carried out in a single logical step to obtain confidentiality and authentication more efficiently than the simple
sign-then-encrypt approach. His scheme possesses the properties of data integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. In 2002, a formal proof of Zheng’s original scheme
was given by Baek et al. [4].
The security notions for signcryptions are twofold, that is, insider and outsider
security, which was analyzed in [1]. Informally speaking, outsider security is security
against the third party and insider security is security against the legitimate users in
the system. In outsider security, the adversary is assumed to only have access to public
information, that is, the public keys of the sender and the recipient. In insider security,
the adversary is assumed to have access to public information and secret information,
that is, the secret key of the sender or the recipient. We will present the syntax and
security notion for outsider security in the next sections. Those for insider security are
similar, with the exception that the adversary A has access to secret key of the sender
in IND-CCA2 attacks and access to secret key of recipient in UF-CMA attacks.

2.5.1

Syntax

A public key signcryption scheme consists of three algorithms: Key Generation,
Signcrypt and UnSigncrypt.
1. Key Generation(k) → (P K, SK). Given a security parameter k as input,
this algorithm outputs public and private key pair (P K, SK). SK is the signing/decryption key which is kept secret. P K is the verification/encryption key
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which is published. Both the sender and the recipient have to invoke this algorithm to obtain key pairs (P KS , SKS ) and (P KR , SKR ).
2. Signcrypt(m, SKS , P KR ) → C. Given a message m, the sender’s private key
SKS , and the recipient’s public key P KR as input, this algorithm outputs a
ciphertext C.
3. UnSigncrypt(C, P KS , SKR ) → {m, ⊥}. Given a ciphertext C, the sender’s
public key P KS and the recipient’s secret key SKR as input, this algorithm
outputs the plaintext m or the symbol “⊥”. “⊥” denotes that C is an invalid
ciphertext between the sender and the recipient.

Figure 2.3: Signcryption
Correctness. The algorithm UnSigncrypt will output a plaintext m if the ciphertext
is generated as defined above.
m ← UnSigncrypt(Signcrypt(m, SKS , P KR ), P KS , SKR ).

2.5.2

Security Notion

The IND-CCA2 notion for a signcryption scheme in the outsider attack model is defined
as follows:
Definition 20 We say that a signcryption scheme (SC) has the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks property (IND-SCCCA2) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the
following game.
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1. The challenger C generates all the necessary system parameters and private/public
key pairs for the sender Alice and the recipient Bob respectively. The challenger
then sends the system parameters and the public keys P KA and P KB to the
adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
• Signcrypt request: A produces a plaintext m. The challenger runs the
algorithm Signcrypt(m, SKA , P KB ) to obtain a ciphertext C. Finally, it
returns C to A.
• UnSigncrypt request: A produces a ciphertext C. The challenger runs
the algorithm UnSigncrypt(C, P KA , SKB ) and returns the resulting output to A.
3. A chooses two equal-length plaintexts (m0 , m1 ) and sends them to C. C tosses a
fair coin b ∈R {0, 1} and signcrypt mb to obtain a ciphertext C ∗ = Signcrypt(mb ,
SKA , P KB ). The Challenger returns the challenge ciphertext C ∗ to A.
4. A asks again a polynomially bounded number of requests just like in step 2. This
time, he can not make an UnSigncrypt query of (C ∗ , P KA , SKB ).
5. Finally, A produces a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
The adversary’s advantage is defined to be Adv(A) = |2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1|.

The UF-CMA notion for a signcryption scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 21 A signcryption scheme (SC) is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-SC-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger C generates all the necessary system parameters and private/public
key pairs for the sender Alice and the recipient Bob respectively. The challenger
then sends the system parameters and the public keys P KA and P KB to the
adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
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• Signcrypt request: A produces a plaintext m. The challenger runs the
algorithm Signcrypt(m, SKA , P KB ) to obtain a ciphertext C. Finally, it
returns C to A.
• UnSigncrypt request: A produces a ciphertext C. The challenger runs
the algorithm UnSigncrypt(C, P KA , SKB ) and returns the resulting output to A.
3. Finally, A produces a forgery (m∗ , C ∗ ) such that (1) A did not make an Signcrypt query of (m∗ , SKA , P KB ). (2) C ∗ is a valid ciphertext from Alice to Bob,
i.e.,UnSigncrypt(C ∗ , P KA , SKB ) = m∗
The adversary’s advantage is simply its success probability Adv(A) = P [A wins].

2.6

Provable Security

Provable security is an important aspect in cryptographic design. When a new cryptographic protocol is proposed, we have to ensure that it’s secure in some security
model, because the protocol may be vulnerable to some potential attacks, e.g. Rabin’s
scheme [55] was believed to be equivalent in security to its underlying computational
problem, but it was broken when the attacker model was changed. Informally speaking, this mechanism prove the security of a scheme by reductionist style, which reduces
security of a defined notion to an underlying computational hard problem. Actually,
the idea of reduction is from the theory of computation; more inquisitive audience can
refer to [65] for further details. The concept of provable security was proposed by
Goldwasser and Micali [30] in 1984, and later popularized by Mihir Bellare [5]. The
method used to the proof is listed as follows:
1. Define a security goal (i.e., unforgeability of signature or distinguishability of
encryption).
2. Construct a security model and set up an experiment between the potential
attacker and the simulated real world environment.
3. Decide what is the meaning of cryptographic protocol to be secure.
4. Select an underlying computational hard problem.
5. Use the reductionist style to show that the only way to break the scheme is to
solve the underlying computational hard problem.
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Though the provable security has its merits, it does have limitations. If the attacker is
not defined in security model used, we can not ensure the security of the scheme under
that attacker model. To date, there exist many proof techniques in the literature, but
it’s hard to find the potential vulnerabilities in the proofs.

Chapter 3
Literature Survey
The notion of signcryption was introduced by Zheng [74] in 1997. Following Zheng’s
seminal work, many efficient signcryption schemes have been proposed [2, 20–22, 33,
43, 48, 54, 66, 76, 77]. The first identity-based signcryption scheme appeared in [45],
but it did not satisfy the semantic security. Since then, many protocols have been
extensively investigated to improve signcryption in ID-based settings [3,13,16,42]. The
scheme in [3] seems the most efficient one among those proposed. Even, Goldreich, and
Micali introduced the notion of online/offline signature [24], but it only makes sense in
theoretical aspect. To improve this, Shamir and Tauman [64] proposed a better generic
online/offline signature. The first online/offline signcryption scheme was introduced by
Zhang, Mu, and Susilo [72]. In this chapter, we will review some existing works which
are related to our ID-based online/offline signcryption schemes.
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Online/Offline Signatures

The notion of online/offline signature was introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Micali [24]. After their seminal work, many constructions have been proposed. Generally
speaking, the idea of online/offline signature is to divide the signature generation procedure into two stages. In the first stage, offline signature is produced before the
message to be signed is known. In the second stage, online signature is produced
when the message to be signed is received. In many applications the signer has a very
limited response time once the message is presented, but he can carry out heavy computations between consecutive signing requests. Hence, the online/offline signature can
be applied under these circumstances. We will present some existing works as follows:

3.1.1

Online/Offline Signature based on One-Time Signature

The first online/offline signature based on one-time signature was proposed in [24]. The
scheme is generic, in the sense it can convert any signature scheme into an online/offline
counterpart. The scheme increases the size of each signature by a quadratic factor,
which only makes sense in theoretical interest. The scheme is presented below:
System Parameters Generation: Given a security parameter k, let (g, s, v) be a
one-time signature scheme and (G, S, V) be an ordinary signature scheme. The system
parameters are {(g, s, v), (G, S, V)}.
Key Generation: On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the original
signature scheme to obtain a signing/verification key pair (SK, V K). The signing key
SK is kept secret.
OffSign:
• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm g of the one-time signature scheme
to obtain a one-time signing/verification key pair (sk, vk).
• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key SK to sign the one-time verification key vk. Output the offline signature σ = SSK (vk).
• Store (sk, vk) and σ for future use.
OnSign:
• Given a message m, retrieve from the memory an unused pair of keys (sk, vk)
and σ.
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• Compute a one-time signature σ 0 = ssk (m).
• Send (vk, σ, σ 0 ) as the signature of the message m.
Verify:
• Given a signature (vk, σ, σ 0 ) and a message m, Verify that σ is indeed a signature
of the one-time verification key vk with respect to the verification key V K.
• Verify that σ 0 is indeed a signature of message m with respect to the one-time
verification key vk.

3.1.2

Online/Offline Signature based on Trapdoor Hash Family

Another notable scheme to achieve online/offline signing was proposed by Shamir and
Tauman [64] in 2001. A paradigm called “hash-sign-switch”, which utilized a trapdoor
hash family (chameleon hash family), was applied in the scheme. With that paradigm,
we can transfer any signature scheme to a more efficient online/offline signature scheme.
The efficiency of the online signing stage is comparable to that of Even, Goldreich and
Micali’s work which does not require any expensive computations. The main advantage
of the latter is that the length of the key and signature are significantly reduced which
is much better than the former in practical sense. We present the scheme as follows:
System Parameters Generation: Given a security parameter k, let (L, H) be any
trapdoor hash family and (G, S, V) be any signature scheme. The system parameters
are {(L, H), (G, S, V)}.
Key Generation:
• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the original signature scheme
to obtain a signing/verification key pair (SK, V K).
• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the trapdoor hash family to
obtain a hash/trapdoor key pair (HK, T K).
The signing key is (SK, HK, T K) and the verification key is (V K, HK).
OffSign:
• Choose at random (m0 , r0 ) ∈R M × R, where M is a message space and R is a
finite space, and compute the trapdoor hash value h = HHK (m0 , r0 ).
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• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key SK to sign the hash value h.
Output the offline signature σ = SSK (h).
• Store (m0 , r0 ) and σ for future use.
OnSign:
• Given a message m, retrieve from the memory a random pair (m0 , r0 ) and σ.
• Compute r ∈ R such that HHK (m, r) = HHK (m0 , r0 ).
• Send (r, σ) as the signature of the message m.
Verify:
• Given a signature (r, σ) and a message m, compute h = HHK (m, r).
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the hash value h with respect to the verification key V K.

3.1.3

Online/Offline Signature based on Double Trapdoor Hash
Family

After Shamir and Tauman’s [64] work, a much more efficient online/offline signature
scheme was proposed by Chen et al [17] to solve the key exposure problem. They first
introduced the composition of a double-trapdoor hash family and a “hash-sign-switch”
paradigm. The scheme achieves the lower computation and storage cost for the offline
stage, and the lower communication cost for the online stage. The scheme is described
as follows:
System Parameters Generation: Given a prime power t, let E(Ft ) be an elliptic
curve over finite field Ft . Also let P be a generator of E(Ft ) with prime order q
and #E(Ft ) be the number of points of E(Ft ), where q|#E(Ft ). G is the subgroup
generated by P . Choose a cryptography hash function H1 : Zq × G → Zq . Define the
trapdoor hash function HHK : Zq × Zq → G as follows:
HHK (m, r) = H1 (m, K) · K + rY,
where the hash key HK = (K, Y ). Let (G, S, V) be any signature scheme. The system
parameters are {E(Ft ), t, q, P, G, (G, S, V), H1 , HHK }.
Key Generation:
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• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the original signature scheme
to obtain a signing/verification key pair (SK, V K).
• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the trapdoor hash family to
obtain the long-term hash/trapdoor key pair (HK = Y = xP, T K = x).
• Choose at random u ∈R Zq and compute h = uY . Run the signing algorithm S
with the signing key SK to sign the hash value h. Output σ = SSK (h).
The signing key is (SK, x, u) and the verification key is (V K, Y, σ).
OffSign:
• Choose at random ui ∈R Zq , and compute ui x−1 mod q and ui P .
• Store the one-time trapdoor/hash key pair (ui x−1 , ui P ) for future use.
OnSign:
• Given a message mi , retrieve from the memory a random pair (ui x−1 , ui P ).
• Compute ri = u − H1 (mi , ui P )ui x−1 mod q.
• Send (ri , ui P ) as the signature of the message mi .
Verify:
• Given a signature (ri , ui P ) and a message mi , compute h = H1 (mi , ui P )ui P +ri Y .
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the hash value h with respect to the verification key V K.

3.2

PKI-based Signcryption Schemes

Signcryption primitive was introduced by Zheng [74] in 1997. The main idea is to
carry out encryption and signature computations in a single logical step to obtain
confidentiality and authentication more efficiently than the sequential composition of
encryption and signature. The size of resulting ciphertext is reduced significantly. We
will describe some PKI-based signcryption schemes in this section.
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Zheng’s Signcryption Scheme

We present Zheng’s original signcryption scheme in the following way:
System Parameters Generation: Choose a large prime p, a large prime q such
that q|p − 1, an integer g with order q modulo p selected from [1, p − 1], a one-way
hash function H, a keyed one-way hash function KH and (E, D), which are symmetric
encryption and decryption algorithms.
Key Generation:
• Alice: choose at random xa ∈R Zq∗ , compute ya = g xa mod p, Her private key is
xa and public key is ya .
• Bob: choose at random xb ∈R Zq∗ , compute yb = g xb mod p, Her private key is
xb and public key is yb .
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ , compute k = H(ybx mod p) and split k into k1 and
k2 .
• Compute c = Ek1 (m) and set r = KHk2 (m).
• Compute s = x/(r + xa ) mod q.
The ciphertext is C = (c, r, s).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (c, r, s), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute k = H((ya g r )sxb mod p) and split k into k1 and k2 .
• Recover m = Dk1 (c).
• If KHk2 (m) = r, return >; else, return ⊥.
In [74] Zheng gives two signcryptions (i.e., SDSS1 and SDSS2). We described the
SDSS1 version here. SDSS2 is similar. Hence, we omit it.
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Signcryption with Signature Directly Verifiable by Public Key

Zheng’s scheme achieves efficiency, but it’s not public verifiable directly by a third
party. Bao and Deng [2] modified Zheng’s scheme to obtain a new scheme possessing
the new property. We describe the scheme below:
System Parameters Generation: Choose a large prime p, a large prime q such
that q|p − 1, an integer g with order q modulo p selected from [1, p − 1], a one-way
hash function H, a keyed one-way hash function KH and (E, D), which are symmetric
encryption and decryption algorithms.
Key Generation:
• Alice: choose at random xa ∈R Zq∗ , compute ya = g xa mod p, Her private key is
xa and public key is ya .
• Bob: choose at random xb ∈R Zq∗ , compute yb = g xb mod p, Her private key is
xb and public key is yb .
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ , compute k1 = H(ybx mod p) and k2 = H(g x
mod p).
• Compute c = Ek1 (m) and set r = KHk2 (m).
• Compute s = x/(r + xa ) mod q.
The ciphertext is C = (c, r, s).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (c, r, s), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute t1 = (ya g r )s mod p and set t2 = tx1 b mod p.
• Compute k1 = H(t2 ) and k2 = H(t1 ).
• Recover m = Dk1 (c).
• If KHk2 (m) = r, return >; else, return ⊥.
Bob can forward (m, r, s) to a third party, who can be convince that the signature is
from Alice. The third party computes k = H((ya g r )s mod p), if r = KHk (m), return
>; else, return ⊥.
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ID-based Signcryption Schemes

Although many efficient signcryptions have been proposed since Zheng’s work, signcryptions in ID-based settings remained an open problem until the first ID-based signcryption scheme was proposed in [45]. We will present some efficient ID-based signcryption schemes in this section.

3.3.1

Malone-Lee’s Signcryption Scheme

Malone-Lee proposed the first method to achieve an identity-based signcryption [45].
Although, it can offer a reasonable security, the scheme is not semantically secure.
Because if the signature on the plaintext is visible in the ciphertext, any attacker
can simply verify the signature on plaintexts m0 and m1 produced during the game
IND-CCA2 and find out which one matches to the challenge ciphertext. We present
Malone-Lee’s Signcryption Scheme here.
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 and G2 of order q, a
generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 . It also chooses at random
s ∈ Zq∗ and sets Ppub = sP . Define cryptographic hash functions as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ and H3 : G2 → {0, 1}n , where n is the size of plaintexts. The system
parameters are (G1 , G2 , P, Ppub , n, e, H1 , H2 , H3 ).
Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes dID = sH1 (ID) and outputs it as
the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H1 (ID).
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDB = H1 (IDB ).
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ and compute U = xP , r = H2 (U ||m).
• Compute e(Ppub , QIDB )x and V = xPpub + rdIDA .
• Compute c = m ⊕ t, where t = H3 (e(Ppub , QIDB )x ).
The ciphertext is C = (U, V, c).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (U, V, c), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDA = H1 (IDA ).
• Compute y = e(U, dIDB ) and t = H3 (y).
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• Compute plaintext m = t ⊕ c and r = H2 (U ||m).
• If e(V, P ) = e(QIDA , Ppub )r e(U, Ppub ), return >; else, return ⊥.

3.3.2

Libert and Quisquater’s Signcryption Scheme

The flaw, in Malone-Lee’s work, was addressed by Libert and Quisquater [42] by proposing a new construction. In addition, the latter possesses the public verifiable property.
We describe it as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 and G2 of order q, a
generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 . It also chooses at random
s ∈ Zq∗ and sets Ppub = sP . Define cryptographic hash functions as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n and H3 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Zq , where n is the size of plaintexts. The
system parameters are (G1 , G2 , P, Ppub , n, e, H1 , H2 , H3 ).
Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes dID = sH1 (ID) and outputs it as
the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H1 (ID).
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDB = H1 (IDB ).
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ , compute k1 = e(P, Ppub )x and k2 = H2 (e(Ppub , QIDB )x ).
• The message encryption is done with k2 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. Compute c = Ek2 (m), r = H3 (c, k1 ) and S = xPpub − rdIDA .
The ciphertext is C = (c, r, S).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (c, r, S), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDA = H1 (IDA ).
• Compute k1 = e(P, S)e(Ppub , QIDA )r and k2 = H2 (e(S, QIDB )e(QIDA , dIDB )r ).
• Compute plaintext m = Dk2 (c). If r = H3 (c, k1 ), return >; else, return ⊥.
Libert and Quisquater also proposed a modified signcryption scheme with forward
security features at the cost of compromising universal verifiability. The modified
scheme is presented below:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 and G2 of order q, a
generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 . It also chooses at random
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s ∈ Zq∗ and sets Ppub = sP . Define cryptographic hash functions as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n and H3 : {0, 1}∗ × G2 → Zq , where n is the size of plaintexts. The
system parameters are (G1 , G2 , P, Ppub , n, e, H1 , H2 , H3 ).
Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes dID = sH1 (ID) and outputs it as
the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H1 (ID).
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDB = H1 (IDB ).
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ , compute (k1 , k2 ) = H2 (e(Ppub , QIDB )x ).
• The message encryption is done with k2 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. Compute c = Ek2 (m), r = H3 (c, k1 ), S = xPpub − rdIDA and
R = rQIDA .
The ciphertext is C = (c, R, S).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (c, R, S), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute QIDA = H1 (IDA ).
• Compute (k1 , k2 ) = H2 (e(S, QIDB )e(R, dIDB ))
• Compute plaintext m = Dk2 (c), r = H3 (c, k1 ) and rQIDA
• If R = rQIDA , return >; else, return ⊥.

3.3.3

Boyen’s Signcryption Scheme

Boyen [13] proposed a multipurpose identity-based signcryption and gave the security
notions for signcryption as: message confidentiality, signature non-repudiation, ciphertext unlinkability, ciphertext authentication, and ciphertext anonymity. The scheme is
described as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 and G2 of order q, a
generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 . It also chooses at random
s ∈ Zq∗ and sets Ppub = sP . Define cryptographic hash functions as H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 ,
H1 : G∗1 × {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ and H2 : G∗2 → {0, 1}dlog qe , H3 : G∗2 → Zq∗ and H4 : G∗1 →
{0, 1}∗ . G∗1 = G1 \ {O}, where O is the identity element in the group G1 . The system
parameters are (G1 , G2 , P, Ppub , e, H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 ).
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Extract: Given an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the PKG computes dID = sH0 (ID) and
outputs it as the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
To send a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
Sign:
• Choose at random r ∈R Zq∗ , compute J = rQIDA , h = H1 (J, m) and V =
(r + h)dIDA .
• Send (m, r, dIDA , QIDA , IDA ) to Encrypt.
The signature is (J, V ).
Encrypt:
• Compute QIDB = H0 (IDB ).
• Compute u = e(dIDA , QIDB ) and k = H3 (u).
• Compute X = kJ, w = ukr , y = H2 (w) ⊕ V and z = H4 (V ) ⊕ (IDA ||m).
The ciphertext is (X, y, z).
Decrypt: Given ciphertext (X, y, z), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute w = e(X, dIDB ) and V = y ⊕ H2 (w).
• Recover (IDA ||m) = H4 (V ) ⊕ z.
• Compute QIDA = H0 (IDA ) and u = e(dIDB , QIDA ).
• Compute k = H3 (u) and set J = k −1 X.
• Send message m, signature (J, V ) and IDA to Verify.
Verify:
• Compute QIDA = H0 (IDA ) and h = H1 (J, m).
• If e(P, V ) = e(Ppub , hQIDA + J), return >; else, return ⊥.
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Chen and Malone-Lee’s Signcryption Scheme

In [16], Chen et al proposed a more efficient scheme and their scheme admits a full
security analysis in the model of [13]. We present the scheme as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 and G2 of order q, a
generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 . It also chooses at random
s ∈ Zq∗ and sets Ppub = sP . Define cryptographic hash functions as H0 : {0, 1}k1 → G1 ,
H1 : {0, 1}k0 +n → Zq∗ and H2 : G2 → {0, 1}k0 +k1 +n , where n is the size of plaintexts,
k0 is the size of G1 and k1 is the size of an identity. The system parameters are
(G1 , G2 , P, Ppub , n, e, H0 , H1 , H2 , k0 , k1 ).
Extract: Given an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k1 , the PKG computes dID = sH0 (ID) and
outputs it as the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
To send a message m ∈ {0, 1}n to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
Sign:
• Choose at random r ∈R Zq∗ , compute X = rQIDA , h1 = H1 (X||m) and Z =
(r + h1 )dIDA .
• Send (m, r, X, Z) to Encrypt.
The signature is (X, Z).
Encrypt:
• Compute QIDB = H0 (IDB ).
• Compute ω = e(rdIDA , QIDB ) and y = H2 (ω) ⊕ (Z||IDA ||m).
The ciphertext is (X, y).
Decrypt: Given ciphertext (X, y), Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute ω = e(X, dIDB ) and Z||IDA ||m = y ⊕ H2 (ω).
• Send message m, signature (X, Z) and IDA to Verify.
Verify:
• Compute QIDA = H0 (IDA ) and h1 = H1 (X||m).
• If e(Z, P ) = e(Ppub , X + h1 QIDA ), return >; else, return ⊥.
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Barreto’s Signcryption Scheme

Barreto et al [3] proposed a more efficient signcryption scheme than previous schemes.
Their scheme can be implemented on more elliptic curves than previous schemes. We
present Barreto’s scheme as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses G1 , G2 and GT of order q, a
generator P of G1 , a generator Q of G2 , a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT , g = e(P, Q)
and P = ψ(Q), where ψ is isomorphism: G2 → G1 . It also chooses at random s ∈ Zq∗
and sets Qpub = sQ. Define cryptographic hash functions as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ ,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × GT → Zq∗ and H3 : GT → {0, 1}n , where n is the size of plaintexts. The
system parameters are (G1 , G2 , GT , P, Q, Qpub , g, ψ, n, e, H1 , H2 , H3 ).
Extract: Given an identity ID, the PKG computes the private key dID =

1
Q
s+H1 (ID)

∈

G2 .
Signcrypt: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below.
• Choose at random x ∈R Zq∗ , compute r = g x and c = m ⊕ H3 (r).
• Compute h = H2 (m, r).
• Compute S = (x + h)ψ(dIDA ).
• Compute T = x(H1 (IDB )P + ψ(Qpub )).
The ciphertext is C = (c, S, T ).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext C = (c, S, T ) and IDA , Bob follows the steps below.
• Compute r = e(T, dIDB ), m = c ⊕ H3 (r) and h = H2 (m, r).
• If r = e(S, H1 (IDA )Q + Qpub )g −h , return >; else, return ⊥.

3.4

Online/Offline Signcryptions

The concept of online/offline signcryption was introduced by An, Dodis, and Tabin [1].
They concentrated in the general security proofs on signcryption schemes, but no concrete scheme was given. They provided the security analysis of “encrypt-then-sign”,
“sign-then-encrypt” and “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” under both insider and outsider attack models. The latter method can be combined with the “hash-sign-switch”
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technique to produce a generic online/offline signcryption. The first practical online/offline signcryption was proposed by Zhang, Mu, and Susilo [72] in 2005. Their
scheme is efficient as the online part does not require any exponent computations. They
also employed the notion of short signatures, which contributes to the short signature
length of the online signature part. The scheme is described as follows:
System Parameters Generation: Given a security parameter k, define two groups
G1 and G2 of order q, a generator P of G1 and a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 .
Define a cryptography hash function H : Zq × Zq → Zq .
Key Generation:
• Alice: choose at random x, y ∈R Zq , compute Ppub1 = xP and Ppub2 = yP . Her
private keys are x, y and public keys are Ppub1 , Ppub2 .
• Bob: choose at random xb ∈R Zq , compute PpubB = xb P , Her private key is xb
and public key is PpubB .
OffSigncrypt:
• Choose at random r ∈R Zq , compute K = ryPpubB and KDF (K) to obtain k1
and k2 , where KDF () is a key generation function.
• Compute offline signature S =

1
P.
x+ry

• Store (k1 , k2 , y −1 ) and S for future use.
OnSigncrypt:
• For a given message m, retrieve from the memory (k1 , k2 , y −1 ) and S.
• Compute σ = r − hy −1 , where h = H(m, k2 ).
• The message encryption is done with k1 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The ciphertext is c = Ek1 (m).
• Final ciphertext is (c, σ, h, S).
UnSigncrypt:
• Given ciphertext (c, σ, h, S) and Alice’s public keys (Ppub1 , Ppub2 ), compute K =
xb (hP + σPpub2 ).
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• If e(hP + σPpub2 + Ppub1 , S) = e(P, P ), proceed to the next step; else, return ⊥.
• Compute m = Dk1 (c) and verify h = H(m, k2 ).
Recently, Xu et al [71] proposed another online/offline signcryption scheme, which
possesses the properties of confidentiality, authentication, integrity, forward secrecy
and resists man-in-the-middle attacks. In the scheme, each user has to interact with
remaining users, in the system, to exchange the key. This could compromise the
efficiency of the system.

Chapter 4
Identity-Based Online/Offline Signcryption
4.1
4.1.1

Introduction
Motivation

Identity-based cryptography has many advantages in the systems as ad hoc networks,
mobile networks, etc, because it avoids the overheads of certificates distribution in PKI.
However, devices in these systems are normally less powerful than their counterparts
such as desktops. This limits their capability to carry out public key operations as
encryption and signing. It will be certainly desirable if the above computations can be
done in an efficient manner and, some expensive operations can be carried beforehand.
All these desirable properties can be achieved in identity-based online/offline signcryption. However, there is no construction of identity-based online/offline signcryption
protocol in the literature so far, which motivated us to propose our schemes.

4.1.2

Contributions of this chapter

Our contributions of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, we formally define the identitybased online/offline signcryption and its security models. We specify two security
notions, namely ciphertext indistinguishable and existentially unforgeable, in identitybased online/offline signcryption. Both of these notions capture the practical requirements of identity-based online/offline signcryption. Secondly, we propose an ID-based
online/offline signcryption which is secure against outsider adversaries. Our construction is based on pairing over elliptic curves. It can achieve authenticity and confidentiality simultaneously in an efficient manner. All costly operations are performed in the
offline phase. The online part does not require any operations in the pairing group G,
and only includes one symmetric key encryption and the addition operations modular
q, where q is a prime and its length depends on the system security parameter. We
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provide a rigorous proof to show that our scheme is existentially unforgeable under
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the scheme is ciphertext indistinguishable under decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. A variant, which is secure
against insider adversaries, is also proposed. We then provide security proof as well.

4.2

Security Argument

4.2.1

Syntax of Identity-based Online/Offline Signcryption

Definition 22 ID-based online/offline signcryption scheme is comprised of five algorithms: Setup, Extract, OffSign, OnSigncrypt and UnSigncrypt.
1. Setup(k) → (params, s). Given a security parameter k as input, the private
key generator (P KG) generates the system’s public parameters params and the
master secret key s, where params is published in the system and s is kept as
secret by P KG.
2. Extract(params, ID, s) → dID . Given an identity ID and the master secret key
s as input, the P KG computes the corresponding private key dID and transmits
it to its owner in a secure way.
3. OffSign(params, IDS , IDR , dIDS ) → σ 0 . Given params, IDs ’s secret key dIDS
and the receiver’s identity IDR as input, this algorithm outputs an offline signature σ 0 .
4. OnSigncrypt(params, m, IDR , σ 0 ) → C. Given a message m, receiver’s identity
IDR and an offline signature σ 0 as input, this algorithm outputs the ciphertext
C.
5. UnSigncrypt(params, C, IDS , IDR , dIDR ) → {m, ⊥}. Given params, a ciphertext C, the sender’s identity IDS and the receiver’s secret key dIDR as input, this
algorithm outputs the plaintext m or the symbol “⊥”. “⊥” denotes that C is an
invalid ciphertext between IDS and IDR .
For reasons of simplicity, we omit the notation of params from the inputs of OffSign,
OnSigncrypt and UnSigncrypt in the rest of this chapter.

4.2. Security Argument

40

Correctness. The algorithm UnSigncrypt will output a plaintext if the ciphertext
and the offline signature are generated as defined above.
m ← UnSigncrypt ( params, OnSigncrypt(params, m, IDR ,
OffSign(params, IDS , IDR , dIDS )), IDS , IDR , dIDR ).

4.2.2

Security Models of Identity-based Online/Offline Signcryption

We now state the security of identity-based online/offline signcryption.
The first security notion is the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks. It is defined by the game as follows.
Definition 23 We say that an identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme (IDSC)
has the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks property (IND-IDSC-CCA2) in outsider attack if no polynomially bounded
adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends
the system parameters params to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
(a) Signcryption request: A produces two identities IDi , IDj and a plaintext
m. The challenger first computes IDi ’s secret key dIDi = Extract(IDi , s).
Then, it runs the algorithm OffSign(params, IDi , IDj , dIDi ) to obtain an
offline signature σ 0 . Finally, it returns OnSigncrypt(m, σ 0 , dIDi , IDj ) to A.
(b) UnSigncryption request: A produces two identities IDi and IDj , a ciphertext C. The challenger generates the private key dIDj = Extract(IDj )
and sends the result of UnSigncrypt(C, dIDj , IDi ) to A (this result could
be the ⊥ symbol if C is an invalid ciphertext).
(c) Key extraction request: A produces an identity ID and receives the
extracted private key dID = Extract(ID, s).
A can present its requests adaptively: every request may depend on the answers
to the previous ones.
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3. A chooses two plaintexts m0 , m1 in the message space specified in params and
two identities IDA and IDB on which he wishes to be challenged. The restriction
is that A cannot choose IDA or IDB as a one of key extraction requests.
4. The challenger takes a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and generates the ciphertext C ∗
for mb as he responds the signcryption request.
5. A asks again a polynomially bounded number of requests just like in step 2. This
time, he can not make a key extraction request on IDA or IDB and he cannot
make an unsigncrypt query of (IDA , IDB , C ∗ ).
6. Finally, A produces a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
The adversary’s advantage is defined to be Adv(A) = |2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1|.
Definition 24 An ID-based online/offline signcryption scheme (IDSC) is said to be
existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-IDSCCMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and gives
the system parameters params to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests as same
as Def. 23.
3. Finally, A produces a triple (C ∗ , IDA , IDB ). The restrictions are (C ∗ , IDA , IDB )
is not the response of A’s signcryption requests and IDA has not been chosen as
one of the key extract queries.
A wins the game if Unsigncrypt(C ∗ , dIDB , IDA ) 6=⊥. The adversary’s advantage is
simply its success probability Adv(A) = P [A wins].
Remarks. In Def. 24, the adversary is allowed to ask the private key corresponding
to the identity IDB in the challenging trip (C ∗ , IDA , IDB ). This prevents a dishonest
recipient IDB to send a ciphertext to himself on behalf of IDA and try to convince a
third party that IDA was the sender.
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Our Scheme
The Construction

In this section, we present our ID-based online/offline signcryption scheme that satisfies
the model introduced in the previous section. Assume that Alice and Bob are the sender
and the receiver, respectively. The protocol is described as follows.
Setup: Given security parameters n, G1 , G2 of order q and generator P of G1 , pick
a random s ∈ Zq∗ , and set Ppub = sP . s is a private key of P KG and Ppub is the
corresponding public key. Choose cryptographic hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 × G1 → Zq∗ , H2 : Zq∗ → {0, 1}n and H3 : G2 → Zq∗ × Zq∗ . The system
parameters are (P, Ppub , H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 ). The master key is s. H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 will
be regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract: Given an identity ID, compute dID = sH0 (ID) and output it as the private
key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
OffSign: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below. (1) Compute
QIDB = H0 (IDB ). (2) Pick random x, y ∈ Zq∗ , and set k = H3 (e(Ppub , QIDB )x ). (3)
Split k into k1 , k2 such that k1 ∈ Zq∗ and k2 ∈ Zq∗ , then store them for future use. (4)
Given a secret key dIDA , output the offline signature (S, U ), where S = dIDA − xPpub ,
U = (y − k1 )P ; also store x, y for future use.
OnSigncrypt: Given a message m ∈ Zq∗ and an offline signature (S, U ), Alice sets k3 =
H2 (k2 ) first. The message encryption is done with k3 and a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm E such as AES. The ciphertext is c = Ek3 (m). Compute r = H1 (c, S, U )
and online signature σ = rx + y; return ciphertext (c, S, U, σ).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext (c, S, U, σ), (1) Compute T = e(−S, QIDB )e(QIDA ,
dIDB ). (2) Set k = H3 (T ), then split k into k1 , k2 . (3) Set k3 = H2 (k2 ) and decrypt the
message Dk3 (c) = m. The correct verification requires to verify the equality e(σPpub +
rS, P ) = e(U + k1 P + rQIDA , Ppub ), where r = H1 (c, S, U ).
Correctness: The consistency is easy to verify by the bilinearity of the map as follows:
e(σPpub + rS, P )
= e((rx + y)Ppub + r(dIDA − xPpub ), P )
= e(rxPpub + yPpub + rsQIDA − rxPpub , P )
= e(yPpub + rsQIDA , P )
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= e(U + k1 P + rQIDA , Ppub ).
e(−S, QIDB )e(QIDA , dIDB )
= e(−dIDA + xPpub , QIDB )e(sQIDA , QIDB )
= e(−dIDA + xPpub + dIDA , QIDB )
= e(Ppub , QIDB )x .

4.3.2

Performance and Size

The proposed algorithms satisfy the requirement of online/offline signcryption as all
expensive computations are done in the offline phase. The online phase consists of
only two hashings, one multiplication, and a symmetric-key encryption. The size of
the resulting ciphertext (c, S, U, σ) is 2 log2 ρ + log2 q + 160, in which ρ stands for the
safe length of group G1 .

4.3.3

Proofs of Security

We now provide the security analysis of our scheme.
Our proof for IND-IDSC-CCA2 is inspired by the proof in [42].
Theorem 1 In the random oracle model, we assume we have an IND-IDSC-CCA2
adversary called A that is able to distinguish ciphertexts during the game of Def. 23
with an advantage ² when running in a time t and asking H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , key extraction
oracle, online/offline signcrypt oracle and online/offline unsigncrypt oracle q0 , q1 , q2 ,
q3 , qe , qs and qu times respectively. Then, there exists a distinguisher B that can solve
the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in a time O(t+(2qs +2qu (q3 +qs +qu ))T )
with an advantage
4
Adv(B)DBDH(G1 ,P ) > 2(² − (q1 + qs + qu )/2k−1 )/qH
,
0

where T denotes the computation time of the bilinear map.
Proof. The distinguisher B receives a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP, h) of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. His goal is to decide whether h = e(P, P )abc or
not. B will run A as a subroutine and act as A’s challenger in the IND-IDSC-CCA2
game. B needs to maintain lists L0 , L1 , L2 and L3 that are initially empty and are
used to keep track of answers to queries asked by A to oracles H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 . We
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assume that any signcrypt or unsigncrypt request on a pair of identities happens after
A asked the hashing H0 of these identities. Any key extraction query on an identity is
also preceded by a hash query on the same identity. We also assume A never makes an
unsigncryption query on a ciphertext obtained from the signcryption oracle. He only
makes unsigncryption queries for observed ciphertexts.
At the beginning of the game, B gives A the system parameters with Ppub = cP (c
is unknown to B and plays the role of the PKG’s master key). Then, B chooses two
distinct random numbers i, j ∈ {1, ..., qH0 }. A asks a polynomially bounded number of
H0 requests on identities of his choice. At the ith H0 request, B answers by H0 (IDi ) =
aP . At the j th , he answers by H0 (IDj ) = bP . The private keys dIDi and dIDj (which are
not computable by B) are respectively acP and bcP . For requests H0 (IDe ) with e 6= i, j,
B chooses be be ∈R Zq∗ , puts the pair (IDe , be ) in list L0 and answers H0 (IDe ) = be P .
We now explain how the other kinds of requests are treated by B.
H1 requests: for a query H1 (ce , Se , Ue ), B first ensures the list L1 does not contain
a tuple (ce , Se , Ue , re ). If such a tuple is found, B answers re , otherwise he chooses
r ∈R Zq∗ , gives it as an answer to the query and puts the tuple (ce , Se , Ue , r) into L1 .
H2 requests : on a H2 (k2e ) request, B searches a pair (k2e , k3e ) in the list L2 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by k3e , otherwise he answers A by a random binary sequence
k3 ←R {0, 1}n such that no entry (., k3 ) exists in L2 and puts the pair (k2e , k3 ) into L2 .
H3 requests : on a H3 (ge ) request, B searches a pair (ge , ke ) in the list L3 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by ke , otherwise he answers A by a random k ←R Zq∗ × Zq∗
such that no entry (., k) exists in L3 and puts the pair (ge , k) into L3 .
Key extraction requests : when A asks a query Extract(IDA ), if IDA = IDi or
IDA = IDj , then B fails and stops. If IDA 6= IDi , IDj then the list L0 must contain
a pair (IDA , be ) for some be (this indicates B previously answered H0 (IDA ) = be P on
a H0 query on IDA ). The private key corresponding to IDA is then be Ppub = cbe P . It
is computed by B and returned to A.
Signcrypt requests: At any time A can perform a Signcrypt request for a plaintext
m and identities IDA and IDB .
In the case IDA 6= IDi , IDj , B computes the private key dIDA corresponding to
IDA by running the key extraction request algorithm and retrieves the (IDB , be ) to
get public key corresponding to IDB from L0 . B can simply run the OffSign and
OnSigncrypt algorithms.
In the case IDA = IDi or IDA = IDj and IDB 6= IDi , IDj , B has to simulate the
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execution of OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms. In OffSign phase: (1) Randomly
choose ye , re ∈R Zq∗ . (2) Set Se = ye Ppub and Ue = re P + re ye P − re QIDA . (3) Compute
Te = e(−Se , QIDB )e(QIDA , dIDB ) where dIDB is the private key corresponding to IDB
(B could obtain it from the key extraction algorithm because IDB 6= IDi , IDj ). (4)
Run the H3 simulation algorithm to find ke = H3 (Te ). (5) Split ke into k1e and k2e . In
OnSigncrypt phase: (1) Run the H2 simulation algorithm to find k3e = H2 (k2e ). (2)
Compute ce = Ek3e (m). (3) Compute σe = k1e + re . (4) Put (ce , Se , Ue , re ) into L1 and
the ciphertext (ce , Se , Ue , σe ) is returned to A.
If IDA and IDB are the identities IDi and IDj . B has to simulate the execution
of OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms. In OffSign phase: (1) Randomly choose
ye , re∗ ∈R Zq∗ . (2) Set Se∗ = ye Ppub and Ue∗ = re∗ P +re∗ ye P −re∗ QIDA . (3) Randomly choose
Te∗ ∈R G2 and ke ∈R Zq∗ such that no entry (., ke ) in L3 and put (Te∗ , ke ) in L3 . (4) Split
ke into k1e and k2e . In OnSigncrypt phase: (1) Run the H2 simulation algorithm to
find k3e = H2 (k2e ). (2) Compute c∗e = Ek3e (m). (3) Compute σe∗ = k1e + re∗ . (4) Put
(c∗e , Se∗ , Ue∗ , re∗ ) into L1 . The ciphertext (c∗e , Se∗ , Ue∗ , σe∗ ) is returned to A.
Unsigncrypt requests : When receiving an unsigncryption query for a ciphertext
(ce , Se , Ue , σe ) for identities IDA and IDB that are not IDi and IDj , B first checks if
the list L1 contains (ce , Se , Ue , re ). If no such tuple is found, B rejects the ciphertext.
Otherwise, he computes Te = e(−Se , QIDB )e(QIDA , dIDB ) where dIDB is the private key
corresponding to IDB (B could obtain it from the key extraction algorithm because
IDB 6= IDi , IDj ). He runs the H3 simulation algorithm to find ke = H3 (Te ) and
split ke into k1e , k2e . B verifies if e(σe Ppub + re Se , P ) = e(Ue + k1e P + re QIDA , Ppub ),
where re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue ). If not, he rejects the ciphertext. He then searches for a
query H2 (k2e ) in list L2 . If no such query is found, B takes a random pair (k2e , k3e ) ∈
Zq∗ × {0, 1}n such that no (., k3e ) already exists in L2 and inserts (k2e , k3e ) into L2 . He
finally uses the corresponding k3e to find me = Dk3e (ce ) and returns me . If no message
has been returned, return ⊥.
When A observes a ciphertext (ce , Se , Ue , σe ) for identities IDi and IDj , he may
want to ask B for the unsigncryption of the ciphertext. B steps through the list L3 with
entries (Te , ke ) as following: splits ke into k1e , k2e . B verifies if e(σe Ppub + re Se , P ) =
e(Ue + k1e P + re QIDA , Ppub ), where re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue ). if not, he moves to the next
element in L3 and begins again, else searches for a query H2 (k2e ) in list L2 . If no such
query is found, B takes a random pair (k2e , k3e ) ∈ Zq∗ × {0, 1}n such that no (., k3e )
already exists in L2 and inserts (k2e , k3e ) into L2 . He finally uses the corresponding k3e
to find me = Dk3e (ce ) and returns me . If no message has been returned, return ⊥. If
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A previously asked the hash value H1 (ce , Se , Ue ), there is a probability of at most 1/2k
that B answered re . The simulation fails if L1 contains a tuple (ce , Se , Ue , re ). We can
find that the probability to reject a valid ciphertext does not exceed qu /2k .
After a polynomially bounded number of queries, A chooses a pair of identities on
which he wishes to be challenged. With a probability at least 1/Cq2H this pair of target
0

identities will be (IDi , IDj ). If A asks the private key of IDi or IDj before choosing
his target identities, then B fails because he is unable to answer the question. If A
actually chooses to be challenged on IDi and IDj , then he cannot ask IDi nor IDj ’s
private keys in the second stage. If A does not choose IDi and IDj as target identities,
then B fails.
When A produces his two plaintexts m0 and m1 , B chooses a random bit b ∈R
{0, 1} and signcrypts mb . To do so, B follows the steps below. (1) Randomly choose
ye , re∗ ∈R Zq∗ . (2) Set Se∗ = ye Ppub and Ue∗ = re∗ P + re∗ ye P − re∗ QIDA . (3) Compute
Te∗ = e(−Se∗ , QIDB )h (where h is B’s candidate for the DBDH problem). (4) Run the H3
simulation algorithm to find ke = H3 (Te∗ ) and split ke into k1e ,k2e . (5) Set k3e = H2 (k2e )
(H2 is the simulator) and compute c∗b = Ek3e (mb ). (6) Compute σe∗ = k1e + re∗ . (7)
Verifie as above if L1 already contains an entry (c∗b , Se∗ , Ue∗ , r) such that r 6= re∗ . If
not, he puts the tuple (c∗b , Se∗ , Ue∗ , re∗ ) into L1 . In the opposite case, B repeats the
process until finding a tuple (c∗b , Se∗ , Ue∗ , re∗ ) whose first three elements do not figure in
an entry of L1 . Once he has admissible elements (Se∗ , Ue∗ , σe∗ , re∗ ). B just has to send
the ciphertext (c∗b , Se∗ , Ue∗ , σe∗ ) to A.
A then performs a second series of queries which is treated in the same way as the
first one. At the end of the simulation, he produces a bit b0 for which he believes the
relation ciphertext = Signcrypt(mb0 , dIDi , IDj ) holds. At this moment, if b = b0 , B
then answers 1 as a result because his candidate h allowed him to produce a ciphertext
that appeared to A as a valid signcrypted text of mb . If b 6= b0 , B then answers 0.
Let us now consider how our simulation could fail, i.e. describe events that could
cause A’s view to differ when run by B from its view in a real attack. It is clear
that the simulations for H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 are indistinguishable from real random
oracles. Because errors of online signcrypt is a consequence of offline signcrypt. We
analyze them together. The only possibilities for introducing an error here are defining
H1 (ce , Se , Ue ) when it is already defined. Since Se and Ue take their values uniformly
at random in G1 , the chance of one of these events occurring is at most (q1 + qs )/2k for
each query. The probability for unsigncrypt simulator to reject a valid ciphertext does
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not exceed qu /2k as mentioned before. We saw that B fails if A asks the private key
associated to IDi or IDj during the first stage. We know that there are Cq2H ways to
0

choose the pair (IDi , IDj ). Among those Cq2H pairs of identities, at least one of them
0

will never be the subject of a key extraction query from A. Then, with a probability
greater than 1/Cq2H A will not ask the questions Keygen(IDi ) and Keygen(IDj ).
0

Further, with a probability exactly 1/Cq2H A chooses to be challenged on the pair
0

(IDi , IDj ) and this must allow B to solve his decisional problem if A wins the INDIDSC-CCA game.
Since
p1 = Pr[b0 = b|σ = Signcrypt(mb , dIDi , IDj )] = (² + 1)/2 − (q1 + qs + qu )/2k

p0 = Pr[b0 = i|h ∈R G2 ] = 1/2(i = 0, 1)
We then have
Adv[B]
= | Pra,b,c∈R Zq∗ [1 ← B(P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc )]−Pra,b,c∈R Zq∗ ,h∈R G2 [1 ← B(P, aP, bP, cP, h)]|
=

|p1 −p0 |
(Cq2 )2
H0

=

²−(q1 +qs +qu )/2k−1
2(Cq2 )2
H0

4
> 2(² − (q1 + qs + qu )/2k−1 )/qH
0

The unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks, defined in Def. 24,
derives from the security of following signature scheme, which is a variant of the scheme
in [70], under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. one can show that an attacker that is able to forge a signcrypted message must be able to forge a signature for
the scheme below.
Setup: Given G1 , G2 of order q and generator P of G1 , pick a random s ∈ Zq∗ , and set
Ppub = sP . s is a private key of P KG and Ppub is the corresponding public key. Choose
cryptographic hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 × G1 → Zq∗ .
The system parameters are (P, Ppub , H0 , H1 ). The master key is s. H0 and H1 will be
regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract: Given an identity ID, the algorithm computes dID = sH0 (ID) and outputs
it as the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
OffSign: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below. Pick a random
x, y ∈R Zq∗ and k ∈R Zq∗ , then store them for future use. Given a secret key dIDA ,
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output the offline signature S, U , where S = dIDA − xPpub , U = (y − k)P ; also store
x, y for future use.
OnSign: Given a message m ∈ Zq∗ and offline signature S, U , compute r = H1 (m, S, U )
and σ = rx + y; return signature (S, U, σ, k).
Verify: Given a message m and signature (S, U, σ, k), the correct verification requires
to verify the correctness: e(σPpub + rS, P ) = e(U + kP + rQIDA , Ppub ), where r =
H1 (m, S, U ).
Definition 25 An identity-based online/offline signature is said to be existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary
has a non-negligible advantage in this game:
1. The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the system parameters and
sends them to the adversary.
2. The adversary A performs the following queries:
• Key Extraction Query: A produces an identity ID and receives corresponding
secret key dID .
• Online/Offline Signing Query: A produces an identity ID and a plaintext
m. The challenger produces an offline signature generated by offline signing oracle using the secret key corresponding to ID. On receiving m and offline signature,
the challenger produces an online signature generated by online signing oracle.
3. After a polynomial number of queries, A produces a tuple (ID∗ , m∗ , σ ∗ ) of identity
ID∗ , whose secret key was never asked in key extraction query. Besides, the pair
(ID∗ , m∗ ) was never asked in the signing queries.
−IOS−CM A
The success probability of winning the above game is defined by SuccEF
(l).
A

An online/ offline signature scheme is secure if the success probability of above attack
is negligible.
−IOS−CM A
SuccEF
(l) ≤ ²
A

where ² is negligible.
Theorem 2 In the random oracle model, if a probabilistic polynomial time forger A
has an advantage ² in forging an online/offline signature with running time t and asking
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H0 , H1 , key extraction oracle and online/offline signing oracle qH0 , qH1 , qe , qs times
respectively, then the CDH problem can be solved with an advantage
²0 > (

1 qe +1
qS (qH1 + qS ) + 1
1
· (1 −
)
)(² −
).
qe
qe + 1
2k

with running time t0 < t + (qH0 + qe + 2qs )tm , where tm is the time to compute a scalar
multiplication in G1 .
To prove our scheme is existentially unforgeable under the adaptive chosen-message
attack, we use Libert and Quisquaters proof technique [44].
Proof. Firstly we assume the existence of a forger A, which by performing queries,
finally produces a valid online/offline signature tuple. On the other hand, a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm - attacker B which answers all the queries asked by
forger A finally solves the CDH problem. We further assume (aP, bP ) ∈ G1 × G1 is
a random instance of the CDH problem taken as input by attacker B. The system
public key is initialized as Ppub = aP . Then, B answers all the queries as follows:
H0 requests: when an identity IDi is submitted to H0 oracle, B flips a coin T ∈R
{0, 1}, which yields 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1 − δ. B then randomly
chooses ui ∈R Zq∗ . If T = 0, A sets the value QIDi as ui P . Otherwise, QIDi is set as
ui bP . B records the tuple (IDi , ui , Ti ) in a list L0 , and returns QIDi as the answer.
H1 requests: for a query H1 (mi , Si , Ui ), B first ensures the list L1 does not contain
a tuple (mi , Si , Ui , ri ). If such a tuple is found, B answers ri , otherwise he chooses
ri ∈R Zq∗ , gives it as an answer to the query and puts the tuple (mi , Si , Ui , ri ) into L1 .
Key extraction requests: when B receives a key extraction query, it firstly checks
whether the corresponding tuple (IDi , ui , Ti ) exists in L0 . If it does not exist, B outputs
failure and halts. If it exists B further checks the value of Ti . If Ti = 0, it computes
the secret key as ui Ppub = ui aP and returns it to A. Otherwise, it outputs failure and
halts.
Online/Offline Signing requests: B randomly chooses αi , βi , ei ∈R Zq∗ and defines
offline signature as Si = (βi − ei + αi−1 ei )Ppub , Ui = αi βi P − αi QIDi , ki = ei . Si ,
Ui , ki , αi , βi and ei are stored for future use. When B receives a message Mi for an
identity IDi , it firstly retrieves the corresponding ui from L0 . The previously computed
offline signature Si , Ui , ki and value αi , βi , ei are also retrieved. Then, it defines the
message hash value ri = H1 (mi , Si , Ui ) = αi and the online signature as σi = αi ei If the
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message hash value has been defined before, B outputs failure and halts. Otherwise,
the signature tuple (Si , Ui , σi , ki ) is returned to A.
The resulting signature tuple passes the verification since:
e(σi Ppub + ri Si , P ) = e(αi ei Ppub + αi (βi − ei + αi−1 ei )Ppub , P )
= e((αi βi + ei )P, Ppub )
e(Ui + ki P + ri QIDi , Ppub ) = e(αi βi P − αi QIDi + ei P + αi QIDi , Ppub )
= e((αi βi + ei )P, Ppub )
Eventually, the forger A produces a valid signature tuple (S ∗ , U ∗ , σ ∗ , k ∗ ) for message
M ∗ of identity ID∗ and gives it to B. B firstly recovers the tuple (ID∗ , u∗ , T ∗ ) in list
L0 to check the value of T . If T = 0, A outputs failure and halts. Otherwise, the entry
of (m∗i , Si∗ , Ui∗ , ri∗ ) must be in the list L1 with overwhelming probability. If this entry
does not exist, A outputs failure and halts. As the resulting signature tuple is valid,
the following equation holds:
e(σ ∗ Ppub + r∗ S ∗ , P ) = e(U ∗ + k ∗ P + r∗ Q∗ID , Ppub ).

(4.1)

Besides we have Ppub = aP , and Q∗ID = ui bP . According to (1) we can get:
e(σ ∗ aP + r∗ S ∗ , P ) = e(U ∗ + k ∗ P + r∗ ui bP, aP ),
e(σ ∗ aP + r∗ S ∗ , P ) = e(U ∗ + k ∗ P, aP )e(r∗ ui bP, aP ),
e(σ ∗ aP + r∗ S ∗ − U ∗ − k ∗ P, P ) = e(r∗ ui bP, aP ).
The solution to the CDH instance (aP, bP ) is (r∗ ui )−1 (σ ∗ aP + r∗ S ∗ − U ∗ − k ∗ P ).
B’s probability of success involves three parts. Firstly, B’s probability of failure caused
by a conflict over H1 is at most qS (qH1 + qS )/2k . Secondly, since H1 is a random oracle,
the probability of producing a valid forgery without asking H1 (m∗ , S ∗ , U ∗ ) is at most
1/2k . Finally, the probability of B succeeds in a key extraction query is δ(1 − δ)qe . The
function δ(1 − δ)qe is maximized at δ = 1/(qe + 1). Thus we have the result
1 qe
1
· (1 −
)
qe + 1
qe + 1
1
1 qe +1
=
· (1 −
)
qe
qe + 1
.

δ(1 − δ)qe =

4.4. A Variant

51

Eventually it comes that B’s advantages is at least
(

4.4
4.4.1

qS (qH1 + qS ) + 1
1
1 qe +1
· (1 −
)
)(² −
)
qe
qe + 1
2k
.

A Variant
The Construction

In this section, we present a better construction of ID-based online/offline signcryption.
Assume that Alice and Bob are the sender and the receiver, respectively. The protocol
is described as follows.
Setup: Given security parameters n, G1 , G2 of order q and generator P of G1 , pick
a random s ∈ Zq∗ , and set Ppub = sP . s is a private key of P KG and Ppub is the
corresponding public key. Choose cryptographic hash functions H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 ,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 × G1 × Zq∗ → Zq∗ , H2 : Zq∗ → {0, 1}n and H3 : G2 → Zq∗ × Zq∗ . The
system parameters are (P, Ppub , H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 ). The master key is s. H0 , H1 , H2 and
H3 will be regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract: Given an identity ID, the algorithm computes dID = sH0 (ID) and outputs
it as the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
OffSign: To send a message m to Bob, Alice follows the steps below. (1) Compute
QIDB = H0 (IDB ). (2) Pick random x, y ∈ Zq∗ , and set k = H3 (e(Ppub , QIDB )x ). (3)
Split k into k1 , k2 such that k1 ∈ Zq∗ and k2 ∈ Zq∗ , then store them for future use. (4)
Given a secret key dIDA , output the offline signature (S, U ), where S = dIDA − yPpub ,
U = xP ; also store x, y for future use.
OnSigncrypt: Given a message m ∈ Zq∗ and an offline signature (S, U ), Alice sets k3 =
H2 (k2 ) first. The message encryption is done with k3 and a symmetric-key encryption
algorithm E such as AES. The ciphertext is c = Ek3 (m). Compute r = H1 (c, S, U, k1 )
and online signature σ = rx + y; return ciphertext (c, S, U, σ).
UnSigncrypt: Given ciphertext (c, S, U, σ), (1) Compute T = e(U, dIDB ). (2) Set
k = H3 (T ), then split k into k1 , k2 . (3) Set k3 = H2 (k2 ) and decrypt the message
Dk3 (c) = m. The correct verification requires to verify the equality e(σPpub + S, P ) =
e(rU + QIDA , Ppub ), where r = H1 (c, S, U, k1 ).
Correctness: The consistency is easy to verify by the bilinearity of the map as follows:
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e(σPpub + S, P )
= e((rx + y)Ppub + dIDA − yPpub , P )
= e(rxPpub + yPpub + sQIDA − yPpub , P )
= e(rxPpub + sQIDA , P )
= e(rU + QIDA , Ppub ).
e(U, dIDB )
= e(xP, sQIDB )
= e(xPpub , QIDB )
= e(Ppub , QIDB )x .

4.4.2

Performance and Size

The proposed algorithm also satisfies the requirement of online/offline signcryption
like the previous scheme. In addition, the scheme possesses forward security property.
When dIDA is compromised, the attacker still can’t reveal the plaintext, since he does
not know x. Our scheme also possesses the properties of IND-IDSC-CCA2 and UFIDSC-CMA in insider security model discussed in [1]. The online phase consists of only
two hashings, one multiplication, and a symmetric-key encryption. The UnSigncrypt
saves one pairing computation compared to the previous one. The size of resulting
ciphertext (c, S, U, σ) is 2 log2 ρ + log2 q + 160, in which ρ stands for the safe length of
group G1 .

4.4.3

Proofs of Security

We now prove that our scheme is ciphertext indistinguishable against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks in insider security model as follows:
Theorem 3 In the random oracle model, we assume we have an IND-IDSC-CCA2
adversary called A that is able to distinguish ciphertexts during the game of Def. 23(with
exception that the adversary can ask the private key of Alice) with an advantage ² when
running in a time t and asking H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , key extraction oracle, online/offline
signcrypt oracle and online/offline unsigncrypt oracle q0 , q1 , q2 , q3 , qe , qs and qu times
respectively. Then, there exists a distinguisher B that can solve the Bilinear DiffieHellman problem in a time O(t + (qs + qu (q3 + qs + qu ))T ) with an advantage
µ
¶ µ
¶
1 1
1
qs (q1 + qs )
Adv[B] > ² · · · 1 −
· 1−
q0 q3
q0
2k
.
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where T denotes the computation time of the bilinear map.
Proof. The distinguisher B receives a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP ) of the Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman problem. His goal is to compute e(P, P )abc . B will run A as a subroutine
and act as A’s challenger in the IND-IDSC-CCA2 game. B needs to maintain lists
L0 , L1 , L2 and L3 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of answers to
queries asked by A to oracles H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 . We assume that any Signcrypt or
Unsigncrypt request on a pair of identities happens after A asked the hashing H0 of
those identities. Any key extraction query on an identity is also preceded by a hash
query on the same identity.
At the beginning of the game, B gives A the system parameters with Ppub = bP (b is
unknown to B and plays the role of the PKG’s master key). Then, B chooses a random
numbers i ∈ {1, ..., qH0 }. A asks a polynomially bounded number of H0 requests on
identities of his choice. At the ith H0 request, B answers by H0 (IDi ) = aP . The private
keys dIDi (which is not computable by B) is abP . For requests H0 (IDe ) with e 6= i, B
chooses be be ∈R Zq∗ , puts the pair (IDe , be ) in list L0 and answers H0 (IDe ) = be P .
We now explain how the other kinds of requests are treated by B.
H1 requests: for a query H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ), B first ensures the list L1 does not contain
a tuple (ce , Se , Ue , k1e , re ). If such a tuple is found, B answers re , otherwise he chooses
r ∈R Zq∗ , gives it as an answer to the query and puts the tuple (ce , Se , Ue , k1e , r) into
L1 .
H2 requests : on a H2 (k2e ) request, B searches a pair (k2e , k3e ) in the list L2 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by k3e , otherwise he answers A by a random binary sequence
k3 ←R {0, 1}n such that no entry (., k3 ) exists in L2 and puts the pair (k2e , k3 ) into L2 .
H3 requests : on a H3 (Te ) request, B searches a pair (Te , ke ) in the list L3 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by ke , otherwise he answers A by a random k ←R Zq∗ × Zq∗
such that no entry (., k) exists in L3 and puts the pair (Te , k) into L3 .
Key extraction requests : when A asks a query Extract(IDA ), if IDA = IDi , then
B fails and stops. If IDA 6= IDi then the list L0 must contain a pair (IDA , be ) for
some be (this indicates B previously answered H0 (IDA ) = be P on a H0 query on IDA ).
The private key corresponding to IDA is then be Ppub = bbe P . It is computed by B and
returned to A.
Signcrypt requests: At any time A can perform a Signcrypt request for a plaintext
m and identities IDA and IDB .
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In the case IDA 6= IDi , B computes the private key dIDA corresponding to IDA by
running the key extraction simulator and computes QIDB = H0 (IDB ), where H0 is the
simulator above. B can simply run the OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms.
In the case IDA = IDi , B has to simulate the execution of OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms. In OffSign phase: (1) Randomly choose xe , ye , re ∈R Zq∗ . (2) Set
Se = (xe − ye )Ppub and Ue = re−1 (xe P − QIDA ). (3) Compute Te = e(Ue , dIDB ) where
dIDB is the private key corresponding to IDB . (4) Run the H3 simulation algorithm
to find ke = H3 (Te ). (5) Split ke into k1e and k2e . In OnSigncrypt phase: (1) Run
the H2 simulation algorithm to find k3e = H2 (k2e ). (2) Compute ce = Ek3e (m). (3) Set
σe = ye . (4) Put (ce , Se , Ue , ke1 , re ) into L1 and the ciphertext (ce , Se , Ue , σe ) is returned
to A.
Unsigncrypt requests : When receiving an unsigncryption query for a ciphertext
(ce , Se , Ue , σe ) for identities IDA and IDB , B responds to the query as follows:
In the case IDB 6= IDi , B computes Te = e(Ue , dIDB ) where dIDB is the private key
corresponding to IDB (B could obtain it from the key extraction algorithm because
IDB 6= IDi ). If Te ∈
/ L3 , return ⊥. Else set ke = H3 (Te ) and split ke into k1e and k2e .
If k2e ∈
/ L2 , return ⊥. Else sets k3e = H2 (k2e ) and find me = Dk3e (ce ). If IDA = IDB
or IDA ∈
/ L0 , return ⊥. Else find QIDA = H0 (IDA ). If (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ) ∈
/ L1 , return
⊥. Else set re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ). B finally verifies if e(σe Ppub + Se , P ) = e(re Ue +
QIDA , Ppub ).
In the case IDB = IDi , if IDA = IDB or IDA ∈
/ L0 , return ⊥. Else find
QIDA = H0 (IDA ). B steps through the list L3 with entries (Te , ke ) as following:
splits ke into k1e , k2e . B verifies if e(σe Ppub + Se , P ) = e(re Ue + QIDA , Ppub ), where
re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ). If not, he moves to the next element in L3 and begins again,
else searches for a query H2 (k2e ) in list L2 . If no such query is found, return ⊥. Else
he uses the corresponding k3e to find me = Dk3e (ce ) and returns me . If no message has
been returned, return ⊥.
After a polynomially bounded number of queries, A produces his two plaintexts
(m0 , m1 ) and two identities (IDA , IDB ) (A could have asked private key of IDA at
this stage). B chooses a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and signcrypts mb . To do so, B follows
the steps below. If IDB 6= IDi , B aborts the simulation. Otherwise it chooses at
random c∗ ∈R Zq∗ , S ∗ ∈R G1 , σ ∗ ∈ Zq ∗ and sets U ∗ = cP . The challenge ciphertext
(c∗ , S ∗ , U ∗ , σ ∗ ) is returned to A.
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A then performs a second series of queries which is treated in the same way as the
first one (A can ask private key of IDA at this stage). At the end of the simulation, he
produces a bit b0 for which he believes the relation ciphertext = Signcrypt(mb0 , dIDA ,
IDB ) holds. The simulator ignores this bit. It randomly chooses Te from L3 and
returns Te as the solution to the BDH problem for (P, aP, bP, cP ).
Let us now consider how our simulation could fail, i.e. describe events that could
cause A’s view to differ when run by B from its view in a real attack. It is clear that
the simulations for H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 are indistinguishable from real random oracles.
Because errors of online signcrypt is a consequence of offline signcrypt. We analyze
them together. B will abort the key extraction oracle, if dIDi was asked. The probability for the oracle to abort is at most 1/q0 . With a probability exactly 1/q0 , A chooses
to be challenged on IDi . For the signcryption, the only possibility for introducing an
error is that when defining H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ), it is already defined. Since Se , Ue and k1e
take their values uniformly at random, the chance of one of these events occurring is at
most (q1 + qs )/2k for each query. The whole chance is qs (q1 + qs )/2k . The probability
for unsigncrypt simulator to have errors is removed in here. If A queries the H3 oracle
for Te = e(P, P )abc , the simulation would fail. However, if A has any advantage it
must make this query, and once it has done so we have trapped it into leaving enough
information in L3 to solve the BDH problem with probability 1/q3 .
We then have the overall successful probability
µ
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Next we show that our scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen messages attacks in insider security model as follows:
Theorem 4 In the random oracle model, we assume we have an UF-IDSC-CMA adversary called A that is able to forge ciphertexts during the game of def 24 with an
advantage ² when running in a time t and asking H0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , key extraction oracle, online/offline signcrypt oracle and online/offline unsigncrypt oracle q0 , q1 , q2 , q3 ,
qe , qs and qu times respectively. Then, there exists a simulator B that can solve the
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in a time O(t + (qs + qu (q3 + qs + qu ))T ) with
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where T denotes the computation time of the bilinear map.
Proof. The distinguisher B receives a random instance (P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem. His goal is to compute abP . B will run A as a subroutine and act as A’s challenger
in the UF-IDSC-CMA game. B needs to maintain lists L0 , L1 , L2 and L3 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of answers to queries asked by A to oracles H0 ,
H1 , H2 and H3 . We assume that any Signcrypt or Unsigncrypt request on a pair of
identities happens after A asked the hashing H0 of these identities. Any key extraction
query on an identity is also preceded by a hash query on the same identity.
At the beginning of the game, B gives A the system parameters with Ppub = bP (b is
unknown to B and plays the role of the PKG’s master key). Then, B chooses a random
numbers i ∈ {1, ..., qH0 }. A asks a polynomially bounded number of H0 requests on
identities of his choice. At the ith H0 request, B answers by H0 (IDi ) = aP . The private
keys dIDi (which is not computable by B) is abP . For requests H0 (IDe ) with e 6= i, B
chooses be be ∈R Zq∗ , puts the pair (IDe , be ) in list L0 and answers H0 (IDe ) = be P .
We now explain how the other kinds of requests are treated by B.
H1 requests: for a query H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ), B first ensures the list L1 does not contain
a tuple (ce , Se , Ue , k1e , re ). If such a tuple is found, B answers re , otherwise he chooses
r ∈R Zq∗ , gives it as an answer to the query and puts the tuple (ce , Se , Ue , k1e , r) into
L1 .
H2 requests : on a H2 (k2e ) request, B searches a pair (k2e , k3e ) in the list L2 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by k3e , otherwise he answers A by a random binary sequence
k3 ←R {0, 1}n such that no entry (., k3 ) exists in L2 and puts the pair (k2e , k3 ) into L2 .
H3 requests : on a H3 (Te ) request, B searches a pair (Te , ke ) in the list L3 . If such a
pair is found, B answers by ke , otherwise he answers A by a random k ←R Zq∗ × Zq∗
such that no entry (., k) exists in L3 and puts the pair (Te , k) into L3 .
Key extraction requests : when A asks a query Extract(IDA ), if IDA = IDi , then
B fails and stops. If IDA 6= IDi then the list L0 must contain a pair (IDA , be ) for
some be (this indicates B previously answered H0 (IDA ) = be P on a H0 query on IDA ).
The private key corresponding to IDA is then be Ppub = bbe P . It is computed by B and
returned to A.
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Signcrypt requests: At any time A can perform a Signcrypt request for a plaintext
m and identities IDA and IDB .
In the case IDA 6= IDi , B computes the private key dIDA corresponding to IDA by
running the key extraction simulator and computes QIDB = H0 (IDB ), where H0 is the
simulator above. B can simply run the OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms.
In the case IDA = IDi , B has to simulate the execution of OffSign and OnSigncrypt algorithms. In OffSign phase: (1) Randomly choose xe , ye , re ∈R Zq∗ . (2) Set
Se = (xe − ye )Ppub and Ue = re−1 (xe P − QIDA ). (3) Compute Te = e(Ue , dIDB ) where
dIDB is the private key corresponding to IDB . (4) Run the H3 simulation algorithm
to find ke = H3 (Te ). (5) Split ke into k1e and k2e . In OnSigncrypt phase: (1) Run
the H2 simulation algorithm to find k3e = H2 (k2e ). (2) Compute ce = Ek3e (m). (3) Set
σe = ye . (4) Put (ce , Se , Ue , ke1 , re ) into L1 and the ciphertext (ce , Se , Ue , σe ) is returned
to A.
Unsigncrypt requests : When receiving an unsigncryption query for a ciphertext
(ce , Se , Ue , σe ) for identities IDA and IDB , B responds to the query as follows:
In the case IDB 6= IDi , B computes Te = e(Ue , dIDB ) where dIDB is the private key
corresponding to IDB (B could obtain it from the key extraction algorithm because
IDB 6= IDi ). If Te ∈
/ L3 , return ⊥. Else set ke = H3 (Te ) and split ke into k1e and k2e .
If k2e ∈
/ L2 , return ⊥. Else set k3e = H2 (k2e ) and find me = Dk3e (ce ). If IDA = IDB
or IDA ∈
/ L0 , return ⊥. Else find QIDA = H0 (IDA ). If (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ) ∈
/ L1 , return
⊥. Else set re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ). B finally verifies if e(σe Ppub + Se , P ) = e(re Ue +
QIDA , Ppub ).
In the case IDB = IDi , if IDA = IDB or IDA ∈
/ L0 , return ⊥. Else find QIDA =
H0 (IDA ). B steps through the list L3 with entries (Te , ke ) as following: split ke into k1e ,
k2e . B verifies if e(σe Ppub +Se , P ) = e(re Ue +QIDA , Ppub ), where re = H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ).
If not, he moves to the next element in L3 and begins again, else searches for a query
H2 (k2e ) in list L2 . If no such query is found, return ⊥. Else He uses the corresponding
k3e to find me = Dk3e (ce ) and returns me . If no message has been returned, return ⊥.
After a polynomially bounded number of queries, the forger A produces a valid ciphertext (c∗ , S ∗ , U ∗ , σ ∗ ), two identities (IDA , IDB ) and gives it to B. If IDA 6= IDi or
IDB = IDi , abort the simulation. Otherwise B decrypts the ciphertext with IDB ’s secret key dIDB (B could obtain it from the key extraction algorithm because IDB =
6 IDi ).
B then obtains a tuple (m∗ , S ∗ , U ∗ , σ ∗ , k1 ). It retrieves L1 , if r∗ = H1 (c∗ , S ∗ , U ∗ , k1 ) is
not found, B aborts the simulation.
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Assume A produces a valid ciphertext, the following equation must hold.
e(σ ∗ bP + S ∗ , P ) = e(r∗ U ∗ + aP, bP ),
e(σ ∗ bP + S ∗ − r∗ U ∗ , P ) = e(aP, bP ).
The solution to the CDH instance (aP, bP ) is σ ∗ bP + S ∗ − r∗ U ∗ .
Let us now consider how our simulation could fail, i.e. describe events that could
cause A’s view to differ when run by B from its view in a real attack. It is clear
that the simulations for H0 , H1 , H2 and H3 are indistinguishable from real random
oracles. Because errors of online signcrypt is a consequence of offline signcrypt. We
analyze them together. B will abort the key extraction oracle, if dIDi was asked. The
probability for the oracle to abort is at most 1/q0 . With a probability exactly 1/q0 ,
A chooses to be challenged on IDi . For the signcryption, the only possibilities for
introducing an error are defining H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ) when it is already defined. Since
Se , Ue and k1e take their values uniformly at random, the chance of one of these events
occurring is at most (q1 + qs )/2k for each query. The whole chance is qs (q1 + qs )/2k .
The unsigncrypt oracle is perfectly simulated in here. Since H1 is a random oracle, the
probability of producing a valid ciphertext without asking H1 (ce , Se , Ue , k1e ) is at most
1/2k .
We then have the overall successful probability
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4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have proposed two ID-based online/offline signcryption schemes in
outsider and insider security model respectively. In our schemes, the online computation is very efficient. Our schemes are proved to be secure against existential forgery
under adaptive chosen message attacks based on the random oracle model assuming
that CDH problem is hard, and they are also secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks under the notion of indistinguishability of ciphertext on the random oracle
model assuming that DBDH or BDH problem is hard.

Chapter 5
A Generic Construction of ID-Based
Online/Offline Signcryption
5.1
5.1.1

Introduction
Motivation

Generic identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme has a great interest in the
real world applications. The reasons are: 1. Identity-based system avoids the overhead
to distribute public key certificates in public key settings. 2. In many applications
the entity has a very limited response time once the message is presented, but it
can carry out costly computations between consecutive signcryption requests. The
nature of online/offlne schemes requires that the online computation is very efficient
and all the expensive computation is done offline which is very suitable under this
circumstance. 3. Signcryption achieves encryption and signature in a single logical step
to obtain confidentiality and authentication more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt
approach. 4. With generic method, we can flexibly use most of secure signatures and
symmetric encryptions instead of using specific signcryption schemes in the application.
An, Dodis, and Rabin [1] introduced a generic method to combine any secure public
key signature and encryption into a secure signcryption scheme. However, it seems that
it’s not suitable in identity-based systems and it will be certainly desirable if the above
operations can be done in identity-based setting. Unfortunately there is no generic
construction of identity-based online/offline signcryption protocol in the literature to
date. All those discussed above motivate us to design an efficient generic identity-based
online/offline signcryption scheme.

59

5.2. Security Argument

5.1.2

60

Contributions of this chapter

Our contributions of this chapter are as follows: We first formally define the generic
identity-based online/offline signcryption and some related security models. We specify
two security notions, namely ciphertext indistinguishable and existentially unforgeable,
in identity-based encryption and signature respectively. We then propose a generic construction of identity-based online/offline signcryption. Our construction is based on
chameleon hash function and pairing over elliptic curves. It can achieve authenticity
and confidentiality simultaneously in an efficient manner. We can apply most of secure
identity-based signatures and symmetric-key encryptions in our construction. The resultant ciphertext is short, which achieves ciphertext size efficiency. We also give a
proof that the proposed scheme is indistinguishable againet adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks (IND-gCCA2) and is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message
attacks (UF-CMA). Finally, we present a new generic online/offline broadcast signcryption.

5.2

Security Argument

5.2.1

Syntax of Generic ID-based Online/Offline Signcryption

Definition 26 The generic identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme is comprised of five algorithms: System Parameters Generation, Key Generation, OffSigncrypt, OnSigncrypt and UnSigncrypt.
1. System Parameters Generation. Given a security parameter k as input, the
private key generator PKG generates the system’s public parameters params,
the master secret key s, a chameleon hash family (L, H) and an identity-based
signature scheme (G, S, V), where params and (G, S, V) are published in the
system, s is kept as secret by PKG and the chameleon hash family (L, H) is sent
to the designated user.
2. Key Generation.
• Given an identity ID and the master secret key s as input, the PKG computes the corresponding private key dID and transmits it to its owner in a
secure way.
• On input 1k , a designated user runs the key generation algorithm of the trapdoor hash family (L, H) to obtain the hash/trapdoor key pair (HK, T K).
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3. OffSigncrypt. Given params, IDS ’s private key dIDS , hash key HKS and the
receiver’s identity IDR as input, this algorithm outputs an offline signature σ 0 .
4. OnSigncrypt. Given a message m, receiver’s identity IDR , hash/trapdoor key
pair (HKS , T KS ) and an offline signature σ 0 as input, this algorithm outputs the
ciphertext C.
5. UnSigncrypt. Given params, a ciphertext C, the sender’s identity IDS and
the receiver’s private key dIDR as input, this algorithm outputs the plaintext m
or the symbol “⊥”. “⊥” denotes that C is an invalid ciphertext between IDS
and IDR .
Correctness. The algorithm UnSigncrypt will output a plaintext if the ciphertext
and the offline signature are generated as defined above.
m ← UnSigncrypt ( params, OnSigncrypt(params, m, IDR , HKS , T KS ,
OffSign(params, IDR , dIDS , HKS )), IDS , IDR , dIDR ).

5.2.2

Security Models of Generic ID-based Online/Offline Signcryption

Firstly, we define IND-CCA2 and UF-CMA notions for identity-based encryption and
signature respectively, then address some issues related to security proof of our scheme.
Definition 27 An identity-based encryption scheme is comprised of four algorithms:
Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt.
1. Setup. Given a security parameter k as input, the private key generator PKG
generates the system’s public parameters params, the master secret key s. The
system’s parameters include a description of a finite message space M and a
description of a finite ciphertext space C. params is published in the system, s
is kept as secret by PKG.
2. Extract. Given an identity ID and the master secret key s as input, the PKG
computes the corresponding private key dID and transmits it to its owner in a
secure way.
3. Encrypt. Given system’s parameter params, a message m and receiver’s identity
IDR , as input, this algorithm outputs the ciphertext C ∈ C.
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4. Decrypt. Given params, a ciphertext C and the receiver’s private key dIDR as
input, this algorithm outputs the plaintext m ∈ M.
These algorithms satisfy the standard consistency constraint if dIDR is generated
by Extract when it is given IDR as follows:
m ← Decrypt(params, Encrypt(params, m, IDR ), dIDR ).
The first security notion is the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks. It is defined by the game as follows:
Definition 28 We say that an identity-based encryption scheme has the ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks property
(IND-CCA2) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in
the following game.
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and sends
the system parameters params to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
• Decryption request: A produces an identities ID and and a ciphertext
C. The challenger sends the result of Decrypt(C, ID) to A.
• Key extraction request: A produces an identity ID and receives the
extracted private key dID = Extract(ID).
A can present its requests adaptively: every request may depend on the answers
to the previous ones.
3. A chooses two plaintexts m0 , m1 in the message space specified in params and
an identity ID on which he wishes to be challenged. The restriction is that A
cannot choose ID as one of key extraction requests.
4. The challenger takes a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} and generates the ciphertext for
mb as C ∗ = Encrypt(mb , ID).
5. A asks again a polynomially bounded number of requests just like in step 2. This
time, he can not make a key extraction request on ID and he can not make an
Decrypt query of (C ∗ , ID).
6. Finally, A produces a bit b0 and wins the game if b0 = b.
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The adversary’s advantage is defined to be Adv(A) = |2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1|.
Definition 29 An identity-based signature scheme is comprised of four algorithms:
Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify.
1. Setup. Given a security parameter k as input, the private key generator PKG
generates the system’s public parameters params, the master secret key s. The
system’s parameters include a description of a finite message space M and a
description of a finite signature space S. params is published in the system, s is
kept as secret by PKG.
2. Extract. Given an identity ID and the master secret key s as input, the PKG
computes the corresponding private key dID and transmits it to its owner in a
secure way.
3. Sign. Given system’s parameter params, a message m and sender’s private key
dIDS , as input, this algorithm outputs a signature σ ∈ S.
4. Verify. Given params, a message m, a signature σ and the sender’s identity
IDS as input, this algorithm outputs 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
These algorithms satisfy the standard consistency constraint if dIDR is generated
by Extract when it is given IDR as follows:
1 ← Verify(params, Sign(params, m, dIDS ), IDS ).
The notion of existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks is
defined as follows:
Definition 30 An identity-based signature scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and gives
the system parameters params to the adversary A.
2. The adversary A performs a polynomially bounded number of requests:
• Sign request: A produces an identities ID and and a message m. The
challenger sends the result of Sign(m, ID) to A.
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• Key extraction request: A produces an identity ID and receives the
extracted private key dID = Extract(ID).
3. Finally, A outputs (ID, m, σ), where ID is an identity, m is a message, and σ is
a signature, such that ID and (ID, m) are not equal to the inputs of any Key
extraction and Sign request, respectively. A wins the game if σ is a valid
signature of m for ID.
The adversary’s advantage is simply its success probability Adv(A) = P [A wins].
An, Dodis, and Rabin [1] generalized IND-CCA2 notion slightly, by introducing an
equivalence relation R with property: R(c1 , c2 ) = true ⇒ Dec(c1 ) = Dec(c2 ) (c1
and c2 are ciphertexts). R is called decryption-respecting. We may use it to restrict
the attacker from decrypting other encryptions of the target message. we say that
the encryption scheme E is ciphertext indistinguishable against generalized CCA2 (or
gCCA2) if there exists some efficient decryption-respecting relation R with respect to
which it is CCA2-secure.
Our scheme is based on the CtE&S which is called “commit-then-encrypt-andsign” paradigm [1]. Before presenting our scheme, we revisit some theorems and issues
addressed in [1] as follows:
Theorem 5 [1] Assume that E is IND-gCCA2-secure, S is UF-CMA-secure and C
satisfies the syntactic properties of a commitment scheme. Then, in the insider-security
model, we have:
• CtE&S is IND-gCCA2-secure ⇐⇒ C satisfies the hiding property.
• CtE&S is UF-CMA secure ⇐⇒ C satisfies the relaxed binding property.
Thus, CtE&S preserves security of E and S iff C is a secure relaxed commitment.
In particular, any secure regular commitment C yields secure signcryption CtE&S.
The chameleon hash function can be regarded as a commitment in here. It needs to
be noted that since chameleon hash functions C are information-theoretically hiding,
it is safe for the receiver when the sender chooses a bad commitment key (the hiding
property is satisfied for all HKs, and it is in senders interest to choose HK so that
the binding is satisfied as well). It is easy to determine that our proposed chameleon
hash function satisfy both properties.
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We can establish from the next section that our scheme is similar to CtE&S except
that we move the expensive signature part to off-line phase. We also modified the
encryption part to be more suitable in identity-based system. Hence, if our encryption
part is IND-gCCA2-secure and we choose some UF-CMA secure identity-based signature scheme combined with the chameleon hash function, we can construct an INDgCCA2 secure and UF-CMA secure identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme.
A proof for the encryption part can be found in Section 5.3.4.

5.3

Our Scheme

5.3.1

A Construction of Chameleon Hash Family

We now present a construction of chameleon hash family [64] with the elliptic curve
analogue. The chameleon hash function is based on discrete logarithm assumption.
• System Parameters Generation Algorithm L: Let t be a prime power, and
E(Ft ) an elliptic curve over finite field Ft . Let #E(Ft ) be the number of points of
E(Ft ), and P be a point of E(Ft ) with prime order q where q|#E(Ft ). Denote G
the subgroup generated by P . Choose a random element x ∈R Zq∗ , and compute
Y = xP . The public hash key is HK = (P, Y ), and the private trapdoor key is
T K = x.
• The Hash Family H: Given the hash key HK, the proposed chameleon hash
def

function HHK : Zq × Zq → G is defined as follows: HHK (m, r) = mP + rY .
Theorem 6 The pair (L, H) is a chameleon hash family provided that the discrete
logarithm problem in G is intractable.
Proof. We proof the hash function above has the properties defined in [64] .
1. Efficiency: Obviously, Given a hash key HK = (P, Y ) and a pair (m, r) ∈
Zq × Zq , the function HHK (m, r) = mP + rY can be computed in polynomial
time.
2. Collision resistance: Assume to the contrary, that there is a polynomial time
algorithm D that on input HK outputs, with a non-negligible probability, two
pairs (m1 , r1 ), (m2 , r2 ) ∈ Zq × Zq which satisfy HHK (m1 , r1 ) = HHK (m2 , r2 ) and
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m1 6= m2 . We can solve the discrete logarithm of Y in G in polynomial time as
follows: Assume x is the discrete logarithm of Y . Then we have
m1 P + r1 xP = m2 P + r2 xP.
We can obtain r1 6= r2 (mod q), since m1 6= m2 (mod q). Hence, there exists a
inverse (r2 − r1 )−1 (mod q). We can work out x = (r2 − r1 )−1 (m1 − m2 )(mod q)
in polynomial time, which contradicts to the Discrete Logarithm Assumption.
3. Trapdoor collisions: Given a hash key HK = (P, Y ) and the corresponding
trapdoor key T K = x, a pair (m1 , r1 ) ∈ Zq × Zq , and an additional message
m2 ∈ Zq , we want to find r2 ∈ Zq such that
m1 P + r1 xP = m2 P + r2 xP.
The value of r2 can be computed in polynomial time as follows:
r2 = x−1 (m1 − m2 ) + r1 (mod q).
NB if r1 is uniformly distributed in Zq then r2 is also uniformly distributed in
Zq .

5.3.2

The Construction

System Parameters Generation: Let t be a prime power, and E(Ft ) an elliptic
curve over finite field Ft . Let #E(Ft ) be the number of points of E(Ft ), and P be a
point of E(Ft ) with prime order q where q|#E(Ft ). G1 is the subgroup generated by P .
G2 is a finite group of order q. Choose cryptography hash function H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n .
Let (L, H) be the chameleon hash family based on the discrete logarithm assumption
and (G, S, V) be any identity-based signature scheme. The system parameters are
SP = {E(Ft ), t, q, P, G1 , G2 , (G, S, V), H1 }.
Key Generation:
• Given an identity ID, run the key extract algorithm of the original identity-based
signature scheme S to obtain the private/public key pair (dID , QID ).
• On input 1k , the sender runs the key generation algorithm of the trapdoor hash
family (L, H) to obtain the hash/trapdoor key pair (Y = xP, x).
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Assume Alice sends m to Bob. Alice obtains private key and hash/trapdoor key
{dIDA , Y, x}. Bob obtains private key dIDB . {QIDA , QIDB } are public to both of them.
OffSigncrypt:
• Choose at random (m0 , r0 ) ∈R M × R, where M is a message space and R is a
finite space, and compute the chameleon hash value h = HY (m0 , r0 ) = m0 P + r0 Y .
• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key dIDA to sign the hash value
h. Let the output be σ = SdIDA (h||HY ), where HY is the description of the
chameleon hash.
• Choose at random y ∈R Zq∗ and compute X = yP , then compute ω = e(yPpub , QIDB ).
Finally set y 0 = H1 (ω).
• Store the pair (m0 , r0 ) and y 0 for future use.
OnSigncrypt:
• For a given message m, retrieve from the memory x−1 and the pair (m0 , r0 ).
• Compute r = x−1 (m0 − m) + r0 mod q.
• The message encryption is done with y 0 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The ciphertext is c = Ency0 (σ||IDA ||m||r||HY ).
• Final ciphertext is (c, X).
UnSigncrypt:
• Given ciphertext (c, X), compute ω = e(X, dIDB ) and y 0 = H1 (ω).
• Decrypt c as σ||IDA ||m||r||HY = Decy0 (c).
• Compute h = HY (m, r) = mP + rY .
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the value h||HY with respect to the verification key QIDA .
Correctness: The consistency is easy to verify by the bilinearity of the map as follows:
e(yPpub , QIDB ) = e(yP, dIDB ) = e(X, dIDB ).
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Performance Analysis

The proposed scheme satisfies the requirement of online/offline signcryption as all expensive computations are done in the offline phase. The offline phase of our signcryption mainly consists of one evaluation of the trapdoor hash function, one invocation
of the original signing algorithm and one pairing computation. The online phase consists of only a single collision finding computation and a symmetric-key encryption.
The Unsigncrypt algorithm consists of one evaluation of the trapdoor hash function,
one invocation of the original verification algorithm, one pairing computation and a
symmetric-key decryption.

5.3.4

Proofs of Security

We can choose most of UF-CMA secure identity-based signatures as long as the key
extraction algorithm is the same as in the encryption scheme below. We prove the
encryption scheme is IND-gCCA2 secure to complete our proof.

Encryption Scheme
Setup: Given security parameters k, n and G1 , G2 of order q and generator P of G1 ,
pick a random s ∈ Zq∗ , and set Ppub = sP . Choose cryptographic hash functions
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 , H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n . R is decryption-respecting mentioned before.
The system parameters are (P, Ppub , H0 , H1 ). The master key is s. H0 and H1 will be
regarded as random oracles in security analysis.
Extract: Given an identity ID, the algorithm computes dID = sH0 (ID) and outputs
it as the private key related to ID corresponding to QID = H0 (ID).
Encrypt: Given a message m, choose at random y ∈R Zq∗ and compute X = yP ,
then compute ω = (yPpub , QIDB ), finally set y 0 = H1 (ω). The message encryption is
done with y 0 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The ciphertext
is (c, X), where c = Ency0 (m).
Decrypt: Given a ciphertext (c, X), Compute ω = e(X, dIDB ) and set y 0 = H1 (ω),
then decrypt the message Decy0 (c) = m.
Theorem 7 In the random oracle model, we assume we have an IND-gCCA2 adversary called A that is able to distinguish ciphertexts during the game of definition 28
that succeeds with probability ² and asking H0 , H1 and decryption oracle q0 , q1 and qd
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times respectively. Then, there exists a³ simulator
´ B that can solve the GBDH problem
with the probability at least ² · q10 · q11 · 1 − q10 .
Proof. We will show how an IND-gCCA2 adversary A of the scheme can be used
to construct a simulator B to solve the GBDH problem. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be the
instance of the GBDH problem to be solved, the aim is to compute e(P, P )abc where
a, b, c are chosen at random from Zq∗ and P generates G1 . B will run A as a subroutine
and act as A’s challenger in the IND-gCCA2 game. B needs to maintain lists L0 and
L1 that are initially empty and are used to keep track of answers to queries asked by
A to oracles H0 , H1 . B gives A the system parameters with Ppub = bP (b is unknown
to B and plays the role of the PKG’s master key).
We describe how the requests are treated below.
H0 requests: At the beginning of the simulation, choose iβ uniformly at random from
{1, . . . , q0 }. We show how to respond to the queries made by A and assume it does not
make repeat queries. If i = iβ then respond with H0 (IDU ) = aP and set IDβ = IDU ,
else choose x uniformly at random from Zq∗ ; compute QU = xP ; compute dU = xPpub ;
store (IDU , QU , dU , x) in L0 and respond with QU .
H1 requests: for a query H1 (ω), B first ensures the list L1 does not contain a tuple
(ω, y 0 ). If such a tuple is found, B answers y 0 , otherwise he chooses y 0 ∈R Zq∗ , gives it
as an answer to the query and puts the tuple (ω, y 0 ) into L1 .
Key extraction requests : We assume that A makes the query H0 (IDU ) before it
makes the extraction query for IDU . When A asks a query Extract(IDU ), if IDU =
IDβ , then abort the simulation, otherwise B searches L0 for the entry (IDU , QU , dU , x)
corresponding to IDU and return dU .
Decryption requests: When receiving an decryption query for a ciphertext (c, X)
for identities IDU that are not IDβ , find the entry (IDU , QU , dU , x) in L0 and compute
ω = (X, dU ), then run the H1 simulation algorithm to find y 0 = H1 (ω), finally decrypt
the ciphertext Decy0 (c) = m.
When receiving an decryption query for a ciphertext (c, X) for identities IDU = IDβ ,
B steps through the list L1 with entries (ω, y 0 ). For each pair in L1 , B submits the tuple
(P, H0 (IDβ ), Ppub , X, ω) to DBDH oracle. The DBDH oracle return 1 if ω = e(X, dIDβ )
and 0 otherwise. If the returned value is 1, B will use the corresponding y 0 to decrypt
the ciphertext Decy0 (c) = m. Otherwise B take a random pair (ω, y 0 ) such that no
(ω, .) already exists in L1 , then decrypt the message Decy0 (c) = m and put the tuple
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(ω, y 0 ) into L1 .
After a polynomially bounded number of queries, A chooses an identity IDB on
which he wishes to be challenged and produces his two plaintexts m0 and m1 . The
restriction is that A cannot have chosen IDB as one of key extraction requests. If
IDB 6= IDβ , B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B chooses c∗ ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sets
X ∗ = cP . It returns the challenge ciphertext (c∗ , X ∗ ) to A. A then performs a second
series of queries which is treated in the same way as the first one. This time, he can
not make a key extraction request on IDB and he can not make an decrypt query of
(c0 , X 0 ) equivalent to (c∗ , X ∗ ), i. e. R((c0 , X 0 ), (c∗ , X ∗ )) = true.
At the end of the simulation, A produces a bit b. The simulator ignores this bit.
It chooses some ω at random from L1 and returns ω as its guess at the solution to the
GBDH problem for (P, aP, bP, cP ).
Let us now consider how our simulation could fail, i.e. describe events that could
cause A’s view to differ when run by B from its view in a real attack. It is clear that the
simulations for H0 , H1 and Decryption oracle are indistinguishable from real random
oracles. B will abort the key extraction oracle, if dIDβ was asked. The probability for
the oracle to abort is at most 1/q0 . With a probability exactly 1/q0 , A chooses to be
challenged on IDβ . If A queries the H1 oracle for ω = e(P, P )abc , the simulation would
fail. However, if A has any advantage it must make this query, and once it has done so
we have trapped it into leaving enough information in L1 to solve the GBDH problem
with probability 1/q1 .
We conclude from the above that B succeed with probability as followes:
µ
¶
1 1
1
Adv[B] > ² · · · 1 −
q0 q1
q0 .

5.3.5

Application to Broadcast Signcryption

A broadcast signcryption can be used whenever an entity wants to send messages to
other entities using an unsecured channel. Such a scheme actually allows the entity to
choose dynamically a number of designated entities inside the set of all possible entities
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and to send a ciphertext, which can be verified and decrypted by the designated users.
Bohio and Miri [9] proposed an identity-based signcryption scheme for authenticated
broadcasting. The use of signcryption in broadcast messages requires less computation as compared to using encryption and signatures separately. Here we modify our
proposed scheme to obtain a new generic identity-based online/offline broadcast signcryption scheme. It has a feature of broadcasting in addition to those in the original
scheme. The scheme is presented as follows:

System Parameters Generation: Let t be a prime power, and E(Ft ) an elliptic
curve over finite field Ft . Let #E(Ft ) be the number of points of E(Ft ), and P be a
point of E(Ft ) with prime order q where q|#E(Ft ). G1 is the subgroup generated by P .
G2 is a finite group of order q. Choose cryptography hash function H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n .
Let (L, H) be the chameleon hash family based on the discrete logarithm assumption
and (G, S, V) be any identity-based signature scheme. The system parameters are
SP = {E(Ft ), t, q, P, G1 , G2 , (G, S, V), H1 }.
Key Generation Algorithm:
• Given an identity ID, run the key extraction algorithm of the original identitybased signature scheme S to obtain the private/public key pair (dID , QID ).
• On input 1k , run the key generation algorithm of the trapdoor hash family (L, H)
to obtain the hash/trapdoor key pair (Y = xP, x).
Assume user 1 broadcast message m to a group of N users.
Initialization: Let QID1 be the public key assigned to user 1 by the TA, and K1N ∈R
Zq∗ be the broadcast secret of user 1 for a group of N users. User 1 will compute
the broadcast parameter P1−brdcst as: P1−brdcst = K1N QID1 . User 1 will deliver the
parameter P1−brdcst to other users in the group by encrypting in each group-member’s
pairwise shared key(k = e(dID1 , QIDi ) i ∈ N ) with user 1.
OffSigncrypt:
• Choose at random (m0 , r0 ) ∈R M × R, where M is a message space and R is a
finite space, and compute the chameleon hash value h = HY (m0 , r0 ) = m0 P + r0 Y .
• Run the signing algorithm S with the signing key dID1 to sign the hash value
h. Let the output be σ = SdID1 (h||HY ), where HY is the description of the
chameleon hash.
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• Choose at random y ∈R Zq∗ and compute ω = e(QID1 , P )y , then compute X =
−1
P . Finally Set y 0 = H1 (ω).
yK1N

• Store the pair (m0 , r0 ) and y 0 for future use.
OnSigncrypt:
• For a given message m, retrieve from the memory x−1 and the pair (m0 , r0 ).
• Compute r = x−1 (m0 − m) + r0 mod q.
• The message encryption is done with y 0 and a symmetric-key encryption algorithm such as AES. The ciphertext is c = Ency0 (σ||m||r||HY ).
• Final ciphertext is (c, X).
UnSigncrypt:
For Unsigncryption of the message, the authorized receivers (i.e. members of the
group provided with broadcast parameter P1−brdcst = K1N QID1 ) will compute the key
y 0 first.
• Given ciphertext (c, X), compute ω = e(P1−brdcst , X) and y 0 = H1 (ω).
• Decrypt c as σ||m||r||HY = Decy0 (c).
• Compute h = HY (m, r) = mP + rY .
• Verify that σ is indeed a signature of the hash value h||HY with respect to the
verification key QID1 .

5.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed a generic identity-based online/offline signcryption scheme.
In our scheme, the online computation is very efficient and all the expensive computation is performed offline. We can apply most of identity-based signatures and
symmetric-key encryption schemes in our scheme. Our scheme is indistinguishable
againet adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-gCCA2) and is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) provided that the signature
part is UF-CMA secure. We also present a broadcast signcryption scheme.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we concentrated on efficient constructions of online/offline signcryptions
in ID-based settings. Identity-based online/offline signcryption protocols are good candidates in secure communications. Devices in resource-constraint systems are always
much weaker than their counterparts in traditional wired networks. Public key primitives, e.g., signatures, encryptions and signcryptions, are costly to use. Hence this
limits their deployments in those systems. ID-based system has obvious advantages
over PKI-based system, in the sense it avoids the distributions of digital certificates.
Moreover, to improve the performance, we introduce the online/offline notion, that is,
all the heavy computations are carried out offline when the message is still not available. The online phase requires much less computations. In real world applications,
authentication and confidentiality are always required simultaneously. Signcryption
achieves encryption and signature in a single logical step to obtain confidentiality and
authentication more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt approach.
In chapter 4, We formally defined the identity-based online/offline signcryption and
its security notions in outsider and insider attack models. The two specified security
notions are ciphertext indistinguishable and existentially unforgeable in identity-based
online/offline signcryption respectively. We then proposed two efficient constructions
of ID-based online/offline signcryptions. The first one is secure against outsider attacks
and the latter is secure against insider attacks. Both of them can achieve authenticity
and confidentiality simultaneously in an efficient manner. All costly operations are performed in the offline phase. The online part does not require any heavy computations,
which comprise one symmetric-key encryption and the addition modular operations.
We also prove our schemes are secure in random oracle model.
In chapter 5, we proposed a generic construction of identity-based online/offline
signcryption protocol. Our scheme is generic (i.e., it is independent of the selection
of signature and encryption schemes). It is based on the work in [1], but we tailored
it to suit ID-based settings. Chameleon hash function and pairing over elliptic curves
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are implemented in the scheme. We also provide a proof that the resulting scheme
is indistinguishable against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-gCCA2) and is
existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA). Finally,
we present a new generic online/offline broadcast signcryption protocol based on the
previous work.

Appendix A
Glossary

BDH
CA
CDH
DBDH
DDH
DH
ECC
ECDLP
GBDH
IBE
ID
PK
PKG
PKI
PPT
ROM

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Certificate Authority
Computational Diffie-Hellman
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Decisional Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Gap-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Identity Based Encryption
Identity
Public Key
Private Key Generator
Public Key Infrastructure
Probabilistic Polynomial Time
Random Oracle Model
Table A.1: Glossary
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